BEGIN TRANSCRIPT

Ambassador Schulte answers a question from ARD correspndent Werner Sommer.

Robert Wood : Welcome everyone. I'm sure that most of you know Ambassador Greg Schulte, who is the U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.S. Office to the United Nations in Vienna. Ambassador Schulte is going to give some brief opening remarks and then take your questions. And as I always say, and you maybe tired of hearing it, but if you could before asking your questions just identify yourself and your news organization, it would be greatly appreciated. Ambassador Schulte.

Ambassador Schulte: Thank you very much. Let me start off with two comments. First, thank you for coming on a cold day when I understand there is a transportation strike, and I was told some of you would probably be arriving here on bikes, so I'm very impressed. Thank you for taking the time to come for this. Secondly, I just want to tell you that you all have a terrific ambassador in Vienna. His name is Peter Gottwald, who was actually the Deputy in Washington before this working for Klaus Scharioth, who I worked with very closely at NATO under Manfred Wörner; and Peter is one of my closest colleagues there. I'm going to see him along with the other EU-3 +3 ambassadors on Monday, and we work very closely together. And I can tell you that the U.S. and Germany and the EU in general work extremely closely together in Vienna, whether it's on working on how to reduce the risk of proliferation or how do you prevent Afghan drugs coming out of Afghanistan. What I'd like to do today is to talk a little bit about the Iranian Nuclear issue. As you know last week here in Berlin, the six foreign ministers of the U.S., Germany, France, UK, Russia and China agreed to the elements of a third sanctions resolution for adoption by the UN Security Council. I saw Ambassador Khalilzad, our Ambassador in New York, earlier this week and he told me that those elements are now under discussion in New York. In Vienna, where I sit, we continue to support the efforts by the Director General Mohamed ElBaradei and his staff to convince Iran to fully disclose its past and present nuclear activities. Full disclosure is particularly important given the U.S. assessment that Iran was secretly pursuing nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, plus covert uranium conversion and enrichment just over four years ago. The International Atomic Energy Agency needs Iran to admit and to explain those activities. So we can be confident that they will not be restarted, particularly given our judgment that Iran is deliberately holding open the option of building nuclear weapons. Eight months ago, in June 2007, Dr. ElBaradei and Dr. Larijani agreed to develop a work plan to try to resolve outstanding questions about Iran's nuclear activities. The work plan was agreed between Iran and the IAEA secretariat in August. And in September, Dr. ElBaradei called on Iran's leaders to complete the work plan by November. They didn't. In November, Dr. ElBaradei called on Iran's leaders to complete the work plan by the end of last year. They didn't. In the middle of January, Dr. ElBaradei went to Teheran to press for cooperation and secured the Iranian leadership's agreement that they would at last complete the work plan in four weeks, which means two weeks from now. The IAEA Board of Governors is standing by to see the results. Unfortunately, these rather slippery deadlines do not give not us great confidence in the motives of Iran's leadership. Thus far, they seem more intent on delaying and limiting cooperation than regaining the confidence of the international community. If Iran's leaders want to regain the confidence, if they want to start regaining that confidence, they need to take three steps: First, they need to fully disclose their past nuclear activities, including an admission and full explanation of their recent covert weaponization activities and the involvement of the military. Second, they need to fully disclose their current nuclear activities, including by implementing the additional protocol and code 3.1., which give IAEA inspectors additional information and access on current and planned nuclear activities. Third, they must verifiably suspend their enrichment -related and other proliferation sensitive activities. This is a requirement of both the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council. Iran does not now need a uranium enrichment capability for civil nuclear power. Russia, as you know, has just delivered the fuel for the only power reactor under construction in Iran. On the other hand, mastering the technology for uranium enrichment is a key component of building a bomb. And our intelligence community judges that this is part of Iran's deliberate effort to develop that option. We strongly support the efforts of Mohamed ElBaradei and his inspectors to understand Iran's past and present nuclear activities. But whether they are successful depends fundamentally on whether Iran's leaders are prepared to cooperate fully, proactively and unconditionally. So far, unfortunately we have seen more defiance than true cooperation. Earlier this week President Ahmadinejad proclaimed that Iran is on the path to the nuclear summit. Sadly, this destination promises to be a cold and lonely place, unless Iran's leaders chose the path of cooperation and negotiation.

Werner Sonne, German television: You still keep talking in the past when you describe what the Iranians are doing in the nuclear field. Is it still the perspective of the United States that they have stopped to develop a nuclear bomb?

Ambassador Schulte: The National Intelligence Estimate that came out late last year told us that we were right to be concerned about Iran's nuclear activities and we remain right to be concerned about those activities. It told us first that Iran had a covert nuclear weapons program involving weapons design, weaponization and covert conversion and uranium enrichment activities just over four years ago. This is a program that was very serious. It was conducted by the military, it was conducted under the direction of the leadership, and it is a program that could easily be restarted the same way that Iran restarted its uranium enrichment activities despite having suspended them. And what worries us is that if Iran restarted these activities, the IAEA might not even know. And that is because the Director General has told us in the two last reports that he knows less and less about Iran's current activity. It also worries us because the judgment of our intelligence community is that Iran is deliberately keeping open the option to build nuclear weapons and they are doing this in part by moving ahead with the most time consuming part of building a nuclear weapon and that is the production of fissile material. Their uranium enrichment activities, which they say are for peaceful purposes, they don't need. As I mentioned there is only one power reactor under construction in Iran and that has just received fuel from Russia. So our concern is that they are deliberately keeping open the option to built nuclear weapons. The time frame in which they could build nuclear weapons hasn't changed; the intelligence says that they could produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon some time in the period 2010-2015. So, you know, we were very concerned about Iran's nuclear activities and we think it is essential that they cooperate fully with the IAEA and suspend those proliferation sensitive activities that would give them the possibility to build a bomb.

Jörg Lau, Die Zeit: Ambassador Schulte, could you elaborate what this new round of sanctions is going to achieve or could achieve, if there is a consensus some time soon? What will this new round of sanctions change in the sanctions regime?

Ambassador Schulte: Well, in Vienna I work on the IAEA. It is the job of Ambassador Khalilzad to work on the UN Security Council sanctions in New York. But having said that, you know, we had agreement amongst the P5+1 or the EU3+3 ministers on the elements of the sanctions resolution last week. Those are now being discussed in New York. The sanctions elements would strengthen past sanctions resolutions and would go beyond past sanctions resolutions in some ways, for example, in terms of having cargo inspections. But the purpose of the resolution is the same as the purpose of previous resolutions. It is not to penalize the Iranian people but it is rather to try to change the strategic calculus of the Iranian leadership, to try to convince them that they are only leading their country deeper into sanctions, deeper into isolation, and they should take advantage of the offer that is on the table to begin negotiations.

Andreas Rinke, Handelsblatt: I have two questions. The first question is you mentioned that Iran has still two weeks to show full cooperation with the IAEA. Is there a link between this time frame of two weeks -- will we get to the resolution, will we get the resolution after these two weeks when Iran has shown full cooperation or not? First question and second question: You mentioned your work in Vienna. How has the US intelligence report changed discussions in Vienna? Do a lot of governments now claim that the Iranian issue is not as pressing as it was before?

Ambassador Schulte: The process in New York and the process in Vienna are related but separate. You know -- and in each case we think that progress is long overdue. In the case of Iran's cooperation with the IAEA, you know, they should have opened their books, opened their file a long time ago and completely cooperated with the IAEA, you know, giving access to the past and giving access to the present. In fact, the way that they have deliberately stalled cooperation only makes us suspect that they are not serious about cooperation but they are rather just trying to delay international action. So in our view and in the view of Dr. ElBaradei, they need to come clean about their past and their present as soon as possible. In the meantime in New York, we want the Security Council resolution to move ahead as the Secretary and Undersecretary Burns have said in the past. We in fact think that a resolution is long overdue. I mean the last resolution was passed in March of last year with a sixty day time frame to a new resolution. You know it's time for us demonstrate to Iran, as our foreign ministers have agreed, that they need to change course and that their activities remain in violation of Security Council actions. Your second question was the impact of the NIE. I think there were those who probably read the first half sentence of the NIE, which said that the intelligence community has high confidence that in fall 2003, Iran, you know, halted various aspects of its program. And I am sure that there were those who read that and sort of [gave a] sigh of relief and said, 'Oh good, we do not have to worry about this anymore.' But if you read the whole assessment and if you put in the context of Iran's overall activities, I think those who have done that understand that Iran remains a serious concern to us. And that the dual track strategy that we have taken still remains valid and that is why our foreign ministers have agreed to it and have agreed to push ahead. I can say, you know, I know that in the case of Dr. ElBaradei, I mean he feels convinced that Iran owes him an explanation of the past military activities -- I am sorry, the past nuclear weapons related activities -- and the involvement of the military in which he has evidence.

Andreas Rinke, Handelsblatt: The question was more focused on what do governments say in Vienna, countries like South Africa, have they changed their position since December?

Ambassador Schulte: Not that I have seen in Vienna. I mean what I have seen in Vienna is countries still want Iran to cooperate fully. At the last meeting of the Board of Governors in November, which is before the NIE came out, almost every single member of the Board of Governors including countries like South Africa called on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA to meet the Director General's calls on them to implement the Additional Protocol and suspension; and I am quiet confident that the members of the board still have those expectations today.

Hans-Jürgen Maurus, German public radio: Ambassador Schulte, I wonder are these sanctions symbolic? And why should the Iranians be impressed by sanctions if they are mainly symbolic? And the second question concerning the National Intelligence Estimate, you said there was a serious program done by the military. Is there any hard evidence for that? Is there a smoking gun because (inaudible) think there is none? And the third one, I wonder, would it make sense to have a more imaginary diplomatic approach in linking the Iranian issue with a general nuclear disarmament issue? I am referring to the proposals by Henry Kissinger, Mr. Perry and George Schulz -- recently were saying that the nuclear proliferation issue is (inaudible) that serious, that nuclear deterrence doesn't make sense anymore, it has become a bigger danger rather than the increase in security. And wouldn't that be an approach to give an incentive to the non-members in the atomic club to achieve what you actually want?

Ambassador Schulte: It's no secret that we would have preferred tougher sanctions sooner. I don't think there is any secret to that. The Secretary said that and Undersecretary Burns has said that. Having said that, though, these are, you know, the sanctions -- the elements of the sanctions resolutions that were agreed amongst the six foreign ministers here last week -- are serious. And they should send a very serious message of determination and unity in the words of the German foreign minister to the Iranians; and we of course would welcome actions taken by individual countries, the European Union, other countries to implement those sanctions and to look to other ways to apply and economic pressure on top of them.

Noah Barkin, Reuters: I am curious for your views on the Russian position on Iran and whether that has altered or changed in the last few months especially since the National Intelligence Estimate. Diplomats here in Germany and also elsewhere in Europe say that Russia is playing less of a constructive role since the NIE report came out. It appears that they were successful in watering down the third resolution and Foreign Minister Lavrov came out a day afterwards and said it was essentially toothless. If you could tell us anything about how you feel the Russian role whether it has changed in the last few weeks.

Ambassador Schulte: I have been working with the Russians for two and half years since I have been in Vienna on this, and one thing I have noticed from the very day I arrived until today is that Russia is worried about Iran's nuclear activities. I remember even at the last meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in November when the Russian Governor said, now we have looked at Iran's so called civil program and it makes no sense from a civil perspective. You are speaking in terms of the uranium enrichment program. And so, you know, my Russian colleagues share the concern of Ambassador Gottwald and myself and many other members of the Board about the nature of Iran's program and the intentions of its leadership. And that is why they have consistently, whether it is in the Board of Governors or in the Security Council, called upon Iran to cooperate with the IAEA and to suspend activities of international concern. That is why the Russians offered up the prospect of Iran joining an international enrichment center in Russia. And when the Iranians said, 'Oh, we will do that in Iran,' the Russians said no, because the Russians don't want Iran to have access to that technology because they are suspicious about what the Iranians intend to do with it, because they do not want a nuclear armed Iran on their borders. Now, as Secretary Rice has said, I mean there have been tactical differences now within the EU3+3, you know particularly with Russia and China. There have been times when we would have liked to see the Security Council move more quickly and perhaps with a bit more vigor. But having said that, the amount of having strategic consensus that at least in Vienna between the EU 3+3 is very important. And it gives us some hope that we can be successful in our dual track strategy. And I think the reason why we have been able to develop this collective approach is because there is a common concern about Iran's intentions and about what a nuclear armed Iran might look like. After Russia started delivering fuel for Bushehr, both President Putin and President Bush said essentially the same thing. They said, look, this demonstrates that Iran can have access to civil nuclear power but it also demonstrates why they don't need this uranium enrichment capability.

Eva Corell, German public radio: Does that also play for China, because you mentioned North Korea and China are playing a key role in dealing with that state as well? So are they also willing to cooperate, because in the case of North Korea they have not been willing to increase pressure to disclose the program?

Ambassador Schulte: I think has been very important. Let me just pause a second. You know there is -- I don't know if this is true in Germany, but in some parts of the world I occasionally have the sense that the U.S. is seen as being very unilateral and quick to use military force. Is that true in Germany too, is that the perception (Laughter)? But, you know, (inaudible). Look at what we are doing with Iran. Look at what we are doing with North Korea. In each case we are working multilaterally to get a diplomatic settlement. And the reason why we are doing that in part is because, you know, we judge that the best way to get a diplomatic settlement is through multilateral diplomacy; is to work closely with countries like Japan and South Korea who are close allies, but also to bring Russia and China along. And in both the Six Party Talks on North Korea and the Six Party plus one talks that we would like to have going on with Iran, Russia and China are part of those. And Russia and China are important in each case. Ambassador Chris Hill (inaudible), you know, why do we think after the nuclear test we finally got the North Koreans ready to start moving again towards their commitment to disarm and part of it was because of the leverage that China applied. So China has an important role to play and the Chinese publicly talk about patience but privately they deliver pretty strong messages to the Iranians about the need to cooperate, you know, with the IAEA and to comply with Security Council requirements. Unfortunately the Iranian leadership isn't quite listening to those messages.

Nina Werkhäuser, Deutsche Welle radio: You mentioned the several deadlines by ElBaradei that Iran didn't respond to. Is there any sign they are moving at all? And they will move in the next two weeks when the next deadline runs out?

Ambassador Schulte: Well, we will see. The track record isn't very good. You know we have had these very slippery deadlines. Dr. ElBaradei, whom we support, has been pushing very hard. And they have been doing their best to drag out the cooperation. They have been doing their best to try to get outstanding issues closed before we move on to the next issue. And now we see as we reach the endgame, what are they prepared to say against weaponization? Are they prepared to admit that they had weaponization activity and explain those activities and explain the role of the military? I do not know. I am not encouraged by the fact that last month the supreme leader was again saying; 'No, no we had no weapons program.' You know, the Iranians had an interesting reaction to the National Intelligence Estimate. At first they came out and said 'oh yes, we agree with it.' And then I think somebody read, probably they just read the first --they probably did not read the whole thing -- they probably only read the initial press reports. And then somebody must have read the whole thing and said 'we better not agree with this, because it says we had a weapons program.' So they have taken a much more nuanced position on this. You know we hope that they are ready to admit to this program. Other countries have done this. You look at Rumania, which in the early 90s admitted that there had been in the communist era nuclear weapons activities and came clean. You look at South Africa, you look at Libya, which admitted nuclear weapons programs and came clean. These are all countries that are in good standing with the IAEA and the international community, and we would just hope that Iran's leaders would make a similar strategic decision. Unfortunately, I don't see them on the verge of making it right now, which is why I think it is important that we continue this dual track approach to show them that they are only leading themselves deeper into sanctions and deeper into isolation and foregoing major opportunities for benefits and negotiations. You know, President Ahmadinejad earlier this week, well I mentioned this, talked about the path to the nuclear summit. We needed to show him that is a pretty cold and lonely place up there and there is a different path to a much more charming valley in which he can be part of the international community and their benefits including the civil nuclear arena.

Hans-Jürgen Maurus: Ambassador, you just have mentioned North Korea. I wonder how concerns about the North Korean (inaudible) I am referring to a certain incident last year. And the second point. How confident are you or is there any concern about the capability of Pakistani authorities to control nuclear whatever capabilities or facilities?

Ambassador Schulte: I have nothing for you on your first question. Sorry. On your second question, we have, you know, as the Pentagon has said, we have no indications to be concerned about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear forces. We have programs that are ongoing with Pakistan to help us with things like export controls and border security. Pakistan is also a participant in the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism, which is designed precisely to help countries cooperate together and work internally to insure good control and good security for dangerous nuclear materials.

Noah Barkin: One of the democratic candidates for President has suggested that should be talking to Iran. I think that also European allies have in the past felt the same way that the U.S. should be talking to Iran's leadership. We are talking with North Korea, why are we not talking to Iran?

Ambassador Schulte: First of we are talking to Iran about Iraq today. And secondly, Secretary Rice has made it as clear as she can that we are ready to talk to Iran, that we are ready to talk to Iran together with our colleagues from Europe and Russia and China. All they have to do is one simple thing: They just have to verifiably suspend their uranium enrichment capabilities. And why is that important? That is important because it is a requirement of the Security Council. It is important because we need an indication of good faith that they are ready to negotiate seriously, that they are not going to do what they have done in the past and that is just to use negotiations to buy time to continue to develop their nuclear capacity. And then finally, that is important because of our judgment that their development, their efforts to master uranium enrichment technology, is part of their deliberate effort to keep open the option to build a bomb. So we are ready to talk and Secretary Rice had said that she personally is ready to sit down with her Iranian counterpart, with her European and Russian and Chinese colleagues, any time, any place and discuss any issue as long as they suspend. So we are ready for the discussion. The question is, are the leaders in Iran ready for that discussion? They have created their own precondition. They have said we are ready to talk to you as long as you accept us violating Security Council resolutions.

Noah Barkin: Well, we are talking to them about Iraq. Isn't that a double standard, to say, we'll we talk to you about Iraq, but because you are violating a Security Council statute we won't talk to you about the nuclear program?

Ambassador Schulte: I mean, this, you know, we are ready to talk to them, but we need a clear indication from them that they are going to be serious about those negotiations. You know, Secretary Rice is ready to sit across the table from the Iranian foreign minister but we need a clear indication that they are prepared to abide by Security Council resolutions.

Jörg Lau: I would like to come back to the comment you made about weaponization. It is hard to imagine that they are going to talk about this, so if they don't what likely to happen next?

Ambassador Schulte: Well, in any event, we see the Security Council moving forward with the new sanctions resolution and that has to do with the fact that Iran hasn't cooperated with the IAEA and that Iran continues to violate Security Council resolutions by continuing their enrichment related activities. If they fail to acknowledge, you know, their past activities, if they blow off the IAEA, and if they refuse to make the confession that Dr. ElBaradei has repeatedly called for, when the Board of Governors meets in March, we are going to have to consider what does this mean and I think what we will find is, you know, if they fail to provide the full cooperation, I think the Board of Governors will have to consider, you know, is this yet another blow to the deficit to the lack of confidence we have in Iran's activities. Is this the end of the work plan? Or is the work plan in fact just an effort by Iran to buy time to throw a couple of bones to the nuclear watchdog to keep it from barking. So I think in many ways whether or not they fully disclose their past activities, whether or not they fully disclose what they are doing today is a measure of seriousness and is a measure of whether Iran's leaders have made the strategic decision that we want them to do to cooperate and to negotiate rather than to continue to act in defiance.

Robert Wood: We have time for one more question.

Patrick Donahue, Bloomberg: To turn that around. I mean, what can happen in the Security Council if Iran actually does come clean with the IAEA even in two weeks, even though is seems unlikely? Theoretically, the logic would be answering all the IAEA's open questions would defeat the purpose of having sent the Iran portfolio to the Security Council in the first place, could that change something? It seems to come a long way, so far with ElBaradei. Could it change something in the Security Council if they do to some extent come clean with the IAEA?

Ambassador Schulte: Well, as I said, the Iranians have to do three things: I mean they need to come clean with the IAEA on their past activities. They need to fully disclose what they are doing today including abide by the Additional Protocol and they have to suspend their uranium enrichment activities. If they do those three simple things, and they know exactly what they are, you know, then the Security Council has already said, they will suspend not only future sanctions but will also suspend existing sanctions. So, you know, if they do those three simple things, you know, explain the past, give full insight into current activities, suspend proliferation sensitive activities, the Security Council is prepared to suspend sanctions and we are prepared to begin negotiations. Now if all they do, I mean if they were to acknowledge their past activities, that would be of course welcomed; that would help to regain some confidence; but if they refuse to give full access to their current activities, if they refuse to suspend their uranium enrichment activities, there would still be a major lack of confidence in what they are doing today and what their intentions are for the future and there would still be plenty of reasons for the security council to move forward."