official texts & speeches
Speech By The Honorable Alberto Gonzalez, Attorney General of The United States of America
Hosted By The German Marshall Fund/Deutsche
Bank/The United States Embassy in Berlin
Wednesday, October 25, 2006
The Rule of Law in the War on Terror
Thank you. This is actually my first visit ever to Germany. I’m not sure I could have picked a more grand day to visit the beautiful city of Berlin. I had an opportunity – I got a walking tour from your Justice Minister this afternoon, and really had a wonderful opportunity to see some of the majesty of this beautiful city. I accepted this invitation to speak today because I wanted to have a dialogue with the people of Germany about our efforts in the war on terror. We consider the German government, the German people as friends and allies of America. We both face similar challenges. We operate, however, under legal frameworks, and therefore there are differences in tactics. I think it’s important, as between friends, that we have a clear dialogue and a clear understanding of what each of us hopes to achieve and the reasons why we choose different tactics. And so that’s the purpose of my visit today.
On September 11, 2001, the world stood witness with shock and horror to images of planes turned into missiles, flying into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, murdering thousands of innocents. And those images, as well as subsequent images from London and Madrid and Bali and elsewhere have left an indelible mark on citizens throughout the world, and they have fundamentally shaped how the United States is responding and will respond to the threat from international terrorism.
When an enemy is willing to sacrifice their own lives to attack our citizens, when their cause is nothing less than territorial domination and a return to the barbarity of the Dark Ages, and when the cost of each tactical success for the enemy is measured in the hundreds and thousands of innocent lives lost, then we face something fundamentally different from crime. This is more than an encounter with armed thugs or gang members. We are in armed conflict with a non-state actor. Every resource of our Nation, including law enforcement, the military, and the intelligence services, have been and must be directed at preventing future attacks before they occur.
By its activities both before and after 9/11—and by its own statements—al Qaeda is clearly in a state of armed conflict with the United States and I would submit to you, with its allies. The action taken following 9/11 by the United States and its allies in invading Afghanistan was a clear recognition of that state of armed conflict. Now I recognize that many countries now believe that the conflict is concluded, but the United States does not. Rather, we believe that as al Qaeda has scattered, the battlefield has widened.
There is a fundamental disagreement between the U.S. and some of its allies as to whether we are still at war. But my main point today is that just because the U.S. still believes a state of war exists, that does not mean that the rule of law has no place. To the contrary, it means that a different set of rules is applicable. And I hope to be able to explain today how we preserve the rule of law in fighting this conflict.
We believe that, as part of this war, and in order to defend the security of our citizens, as well as the lives of citizens of Europe, we must have the ability to detain and remove terrorists from battlefields of this conflict; to collect from them the vital intelligence that enables us to capture their associates and break up future terrorist plots; and to create effective and fair procedures that will allow us to prosecute and punish captured terrorists for their war crimes.
The legal doctrines directed at achieving these ends are not the same as those we would employ during peacetime. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this in several of its decisions, including its recent Hamdan decision. The United States Congress likewise has endorsed this view, most recently in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Over the past five years, the United States and its allies can point to a number of successes in our fight against terrorism. Our intelligence-gathering efforts were instrumental in capturing dozens of Osama bin Laden’s closest associates, including the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, as well as Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi bin al Shibh. And the capture of those terrorists has led to actionable intelligence that has disrupted many other terrorist plots through both law enforcement and military operations.
We have broken up a cell of 17 Southeast Asian terrorist operatives being groomed for attacks inside the United States; we’ve uncovered key operatives in al Qaeda’s biological weapons program – including a cell developing anthrax to be used in terrorist attacks. We have stopped planned attacks on U.S. Marines in Djibouti, and on the U.S. consulate in Karachi, and we have foiled a plot to hijack passenger planes and fly them into Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London.
As we know, just this summer, British investigators thwarted an al Qaeda plan to blow up airplanes bound for the United States with common household liquids. And these successes, and the vigorous prosecution of the armed conflict with al Qaeda, have undoubtedly made us safer, but we cannot kid ourselves – we cannot delude our selves. We are not yet safe. The United States and our allies are still targets. And so, accordingly, we continue to work with our allies to identify new ways to contain and combat the ever-changing threat of terrorism.
Today, I would like to address one such way—the Military Commissions Act. This is a new American law which provides for the full and fair trials of captured terrorists; reinforces and clarifies United States obligations under the Geneva Conventions; and buttresses our ability to gather vital intelligence and disrupt future terrorist attacks.
The Detention of Enemy Combatants
With respect to our international obligations, the United States provides individuals detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo with far greater legal rights than those owed to lawful prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. As many of you know, the Third Geneva Convention requires that, where there is any doubt regarding a belligerent’s status as a prisoner of war, the detaining power must bring the individual before an “Article 5” military tribunal to determine whether the individual warrants the enhanced privileges of prisoners of war. The Geneva Conventions otherwise provide that enemy combatants may be detained for the duration of the hostilities, a fundamental precept of the law of war.
The United States goes well beyond these international obligations in the course of this present conflict. As President Bush has stated, the United States has no interest, no desire in serving as the world’s jailer, and we have no interest, no desire in detaining individuals who do not threaten our citizens. Accordingly, we have released alien enemy combatants to their home countries where those nations have agreed that they will prevent such individuals from returning to combat, and where we have been assured that those nations will treat such individuals humanely. Indeed, we have repeatedly asked our European allies to join us in these efforts by agreeing to take back their citizens detained at Guantanamo or by helping persuade other countries to provide better security and human rights assurances to allow us to increase the number of transfers. But despite demands from others that Guantanamo be closed, the United States has received little help from our European allies regarding the fate of these detainees.
And we also put in place procedures to ensure that the individuals we detain are, in fact, enemy combatants. The United States gives Article 5-like “Combatant Status Review Tribunals” to every detainee held at Guantanamo to determine whether they should be detained as an enemy combatant at all. And based on the decisions of these tribunals and based on our parallel efforts to repatriate detainees where appropriate and consistent with our national security, we have transferred approximately 340 individuals from Guantanamo.
The legal rights afforded to detainees do not stop there. Our law provides that each and every detainee has the opportunity to appeal the determination of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal to the federal court of appeals in Washington, D.C. In other words, the United States provides every detainee at Guantanamo Bay the opportunity to challenge his detention not merely before a military tribunal, but also before a civilian court.
And these points, it seems to me, are lost in the recent debate over the Act’s restrictions on habeas corpus, which allows an individual in police custody to seek his release from detention before a civilian judge. Indeed, the entire debate is premised on several misconceptions. First, habeas corpus is a civilian remedy. Alien enemy combatants captured outside the United States have never had the right to file a writ of habeas corpus under the United States Constitution in prior armed conflicts. Thus, the restrictions on habeas corpus do not, and cannot, deprive enemy combatants of any constitutional right that they have ever had under United States law.
And second, as I have explained, the United States already provides enemy combatants with the opportunity to challenge the legality of their detention before a civilian court, by appealing the determinations of our Combatant Status Review Tribunals. This process—which goes well beyond what is required for lawful prisoners of war under both international and domestic law—provides the same opportunity to get into federal court that these individuals would claim through the writ of habeas corpus.
Although some critics have focused on detention, the Military Commissions Act is fundamentally about prosecution. The law permits the prosecution of suspected war criminals before military commissions, which have been used during times of war by the United States and other countries. By law, these commissions can be used to try only “unlawful enemy combatants.” This definition expressly excludes lawful prisoners of war, and it is carefully defined to include only those unlawful combatants who have taken active and purposeful steps to further hostilities against the United States and its allies not those who may provide an incidental or unintended benefit to the enemy.
Some have questioned why terrorists should be tried as war criminals in the first place. Although the law of war permits us to detain dangerous enemy combatants for the duration of hostilities to keep them from attacking us, we also believe that we must have the capability to bring them to justice for their crimes. And some ask, why not then try these terrorists in civilian courts just like any other individual who commits a crime? Here again, this view reflects a fundamental denial of the existence and the practicalities of this armed conflict.
In this conflict against terrorism, members of al Qaeda are not merely common criminals. Al Qaeda seeks to employ weapons of mass slaughter as a means of achieving political goals against both the civilian and military capacity of the United States, Europe, and our allies throughout the world. Their members continue to fight our Armed Forces on battlefields across the world, and they will continue to do so until we stop them. Their crimes are nothing less than war crimes.
And for hundreds of years, the United States and other nations have used military commissions—not civilian courts—to try enemy combatants under such circumstances. Indeed, Article 84 of the Geneva Conventions provides that lawful prisoners of war must be tried by military, not civilian, courts. It is entirely fitting that we continue to do so, consistent with our obligations under both international and domestic law.
Equally as important, military commissions are necessary because in many cases, the use of civilian courts would simply be unavailable or impractical. The collection of evidence and the prosecution of terrorists pose a host of difficulties not associated with the civilian justice system. For example, our civilian courts in the United States strictly limit the introduction of hearsay statements, that is, the admission into evidence of the assertions of individuals not present in court. Yet many whose statements we will need for military commissions are likely to be foreign nationals who are not subject to the jurisdiction of a United States tribunal, or who may be unavailable because of military necessity, incarceration, injury, or death. Therefore, if we are to put terrorists on trial, military commissions must be permitted to hear a broad range of evidence, including hearsay evidence where it is reliable. International war crimes tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, have similarly adopted broad rules of admissibility. This is nothing novel; nothing new here.
Finally, our civilian justice system provides for strict rules governing the collection and authentication of evidence. But battlefields and foreign terrorist safe houses are not like typical crime scenes, and the United States military cannot be expected to gather evidence like police officers in the course of fighting the enemy. Again, like international war crimes tribunals, military commissions will consider a broad range of evidence—all evidence that the military judge, who is certified by the military, deems to be reliable and probative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Protections Afforded by Military Commissions
Although military commissions are both necessary and appropriate, let me emphasize that they are also venues in which the accused will receive a full and fair trial. The procedures for military commissions, like those of international war crimes tribunals, are adapted to wartime circumstances, but they contain all of the procedural protections that we in the international community –you and I -- regard as fundamental.
Just consider the specific protections afforded by the legislation Congress enacted:
• The trial itself will be presided over by an independent military judge, drawn from among the same judges who preside over the courts-martial of U.S. troops, and whose impartiality is protected under law.
• The accused shall be presumed innocent unless and until the prosecution proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—the highest standard of proof recognized under U.S. law.
• The accused shall have the right to examine and respond to every piece of evidence—including classified evidence—that is introduced before the trier of fact.
• The world community, too, shall have the right to see the evidence and observe the proceedings, because, with a narrow exception for national security, all trial proceedings shall be open and public.
• The Act plainly and unequivocally bars all evidence collected through torture, as under domestic and international law. The United States does not engage in torture, and consistent with our law and practice, no evidence obtained by torture shall be admitted at a commission proceeding.
• For statements of the accused, the law further provides that the judge may admit such evidence only if he finds that the statements are reliable and that their admission would serve the interests of justice. This rule tracks closely Rule 95 of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, both of which require an inquiry into the reliability of the evidence and its impact on the integrity of the procedures.
• The law does not, as some have charged, require the admission of coerced evidence. Rather, it simply provides that an impartial judge shall determine under the circumstances whether the evidence is fit to be considered by the trier of fact.
• In addition to these protections at trial, the Act grants convicted terrorists several opportunities to appeal, both to a military review court and to a civilian court of appeals, as I have already discussed. The Supreme Court of the United States may also exercise jurisdiction to review commission judgments. As in the detention context, this access to our domestic courts is another extraordinary protection in the history of armed conflict when dealing with unlawful enemy combatants.
Implementing the Geneva Conventions
The Military Commissions Act thus establishes military commissions in compliance with the law of war, which includes the Geneva Conventions. The Act also contains critical provisions to clarify the meaning of those Conventions.
I do not believe the Geneva Conventions were drafted with the threat of al Qaeda in mind. The drafters of the Conventions understood armed conflict as a choice between two models: international conflicts between nation-states and civil wars within a single State. And last summer, our Supreme Court held that Common Article 3 applies to our conflict with al Qaeda.
Common Article 3 has been part of the Geneva Conventions as we all know since 1949, yet some of its provisions, such as its prohibition upon “outrages upon personal dignity,” are not well-defined. What constitutes an “outrage upon personal dignity” or “humiliating and degrading treatment”? International law provides relatively few precedents, and the law which does exist suggests that courts have been unable to reach a consistent conclusion. The United States takes its treaty obligations seriously, however, and indeed, we had previously made any violation of Common Article 3 a war crime. The Military Commissions Act reinforces the commitment of the United States to Geneva by providing clarity to the meaning of its terms under our domestic law.
The Act clearly defines nine “grave breaches” of Common Article 3. These include things like murder and torture—all of which were already illegal under United States law, and none of which America has ever condoned. These also include clear and undeniable outrages upon personal dignity, such as rape, sexual abuse, and the performing of human experiments.
Beyond the floor set by these provisions, the Act then provides that the President may issue regulations concerning our understanding of the Geneva Conventions for conduct that falls short of a “grave breach”—for example, conduct that constitutes an “outrage” upon personal dignity” or “humiliating and degrading treatment.” These regulations, from the President, will be public, and therefore open to congressional and public scrutiny.
Conclusion
Now I close with a reminder that Germany and the United States are great nations, but neither will succeed in defeating terrorism without the help of the other, and the help of other friends and allies. Though there may be differences in approach, our objectives are the same, as I said in the outset. It is important that we continue to dialogue, to discuss, to educate. Our friendship is based on trust, and trust is based on understanding and understanding based on communication. Germany and other European countries have more experience dealing with terrorism. I am sure there are lessons we can learn from you. And I hope in our discussions that you may find that there are some things that you may learn from us as well.
Germany and the United States have taken great strides in fighting terrorism, but there is still much work left to do. For those of us who work at the United States Department of Justice, everyday is September 12, 2001. Everyday is that day after. Everyday requires renewed commitment to combating and preventing terrorism. And everyday we will look to the Government of Germany and to the German people as our partner in making the world a safer place for our children and grandchildren.
Thank you very much for having me.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q&A Session at the German Marshall Fund
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales 10/25/06
Q: Good evening, my name is Clemens Wergin. I am an editorial writer for Tagesspiegel, a national daily from Berlin. Mr. Gonzales, one question you said that there had been problems in referring, transferring prisoners from Guantanamo. You mentioned that Europeans have been taken, haven’t been willing to take back.
A: Do you want me to identify the nations by name?
Q: Yes, I would like you to identify the nations by name and the cases you were referring to.
A: Let’s try to get your name and where you can be contacted…
Q: Clemens Wergin.
A: As to whether or not I can give you specific instances …. Because what we try to do, of course, if we have someone from -- I’ll just talk in general terms before -- I’m not going to identify from the podium specific countries, particularly if I might be referring to this great country Germany. Let me just say this when we have someone in detention at Guantanamo, we reach out to the home countries and an assessment is made as to whether or not can this person be transferred. If we assess that the person is someone who is dangerous, remains a threat to the United States, remains a threat to our friends and allies, we try to reach some kind of agreement as to what precautions are going to be taken to address that threat. We are also of course concerned about the human treatment of that individual and we seek assurances as we are obligated to do with respect to the rendition or transfer of individuals to another country that they will not be, that they will be treated humanly. What I can say is that there have been occasions where countries are unwilling to provide the level of assurances that we think are appropriate in order to secure the national security of our country and our friends and allies; and in some cases we are not comfortable with the assurances given to us with respect to the treatment that they are going to receive and therefore we are left continuing to detain this individual. As I indicated in my remarks, Guantanamo exists because it is necessary. It was created because of a necessity. It will not exist one day longer than it is necessary, and we seek to find a long term solution to detainees captured on the battle field, but until we are able to do that we have an obligation to the men and women fighting in uniform for their protection. As you may know, there have been over, I believe a dozen occasions where someone who is detained at Guantanamo was released and we discovered them fighting against the United States again and our allies again; and so it’s difficult for me to come up with the words that I would say to the parents of a young soldier who has been killed by someone we had once detained at Guantanamo and then released. And so this is an obligation we take very, very seriously in each and every case.
Q: Henning Rieke, German Council on Foreign Relations. Attorney General, I think there is a pressing need to find an international consensus on how to cope with those prisoners of war that are non combatants, but there is no such consensus. It is not enough to oppose competing interpretations of the existing law. There must be rapprochement. Up to now I think this is a heavy burden on transatlantic relations and I wonder what are the perspectives of either creating new international legal provisions or creating new multi-national bodies to cope with these kinds of war criminals that are not really fitting in to any of the draws that we have in the legal system. So what is your view on the perspectives of that?
A: I think that, there has already been a lot of thinking done about it within the United States. I suspect there has been a lot of thinking done about it in European capitals around the world because I think it’s necessary. I think we realize it that this is a unique challenge to not only the United States but to our friends and allies around the world. And there is no question about it; it has been a source of unease and friction between the United States Europe. We understand that and we are part of the blame for that, I must confess. I don’t think we probably did a good a job as we could have from the outset in explaining our thinking and explaining our approach and explaining the legal basis for the actions that we have taken. This is one of the reasons why John Bellinger from State Department was here a week or two ago meeting with several of your experts to talk about this issue and that’s why I’m here today to have a dialogue and a discussion. I’m not here to say that the United States have all the right answers. As I indicated in my remarks we understand that many, many countries around the world have dealt with this issue for quite some time and there are things we can learn from you, and so we’re here to listen as well. I do think that it makes sense to have discussions amongst the nations of the world about what is the best way, should there be a new legal frame work that should be developed to deal with this new kind of threat because I hate to say this, but I will, and I think it’s obvious. This is not a threat that is going to go away any time soon. These are threats that will exist and unfortunately probably continue to burden us during, in our generation and perhaps the generations of our children, and so this is something that requires our concerted effort and requires creative thinking and to pursue a frame work where the national security of our countries can be insured, where basic human rights can be protected. That’s all very important. Obviously, when we talk about looking at changes in the legal frame work it’s got to be done in a way that does respect certain basic human rights and basic respect for human values and human life.
Q: Wilmar. My constituency is in the Western part of Germany. When I listen to you, Sir, I remembered the situation ten years ago when important members of your government, U.S. government, were very proud to have created the Taliban in Afghanistan; and therefore you might imagine that I’m very careful in listening to voices coming from Washington. And when I read the International Herald Tribune yesterday and the internal debate in the United States about the question whether somebody is innocent as long as it is not proven that he is guilty, that there are ideas in the United States to change this idea. I think it creates more than problems in the stomach. Perhaps it was the European part of the International Herald Tribune to express these ideas. And the third question dealing with the military, you told us that, yes, we know Afghanistan and other areas where we are together in battle. When we look in our legal understanding on Baghram, Guantanamo and the military commission act, it is far beyond our European standards of a legal system, and it is a problem for our military to deal with U.S. forces under these circumstances. What is your idea to come together again as we had been here for fifty years?
A: I don’t know if there was a question in your first point about the situation. I think you were making the point that you’re distrustful what we say regarding the Taliban. I respect your views on that. And the second was ... I’m not aware of this debate, I’m not aware of an ongoing discussion within the United States government to change the standards of guilt or innocence. I’m not sure where the sources -- I’m just saying that as the Attorney General of the United States, I’m not aware of the sources of that story. And the third point is, how can we come together. We understand that there is disagreement about the policies and tactics of the United States and the way that we deal with this threat of terrorism. My own view is that the United States is stronger, strongest when it has the help and support of our friends and allies. I think every country is. At the end of the day, the President of the United States is going to do what he believes he needs to do to protect our country so long as it’s consistent with our domestic and international legal obligations. We are working as hard as we can to try to find solutions that involve the world community because this is a world problem. This is not just a threat to the United States and it requires a combined effort, and so, you ask what we’re doing, we’re trying to sit down with the world community, have a discussion about the way forward. I think we have, you know, we’re anxious to hear your views, but you have to understand also that and remember -- I’m sure you do -- that we operate under different legal frame works and there are different kinds of threats, and nonetheless we are committed to doing what we can to find common solution to this problem, and we look forward to continue to talking with groups like this one and government leaders around Europe about what is the best way forward.
Q: Andreas Ettkes. I teach American History at the Kennedy Institute and I’m here with this group of graduate students taking class in public diplomacy, so we saw a little bit of public diplomacy life. I mean there are a lot of differences about the war on terror but I think one thing that’s frustrating to maybe not people like me is the feeling that the current administration is not very good in admitting any mistakes and saying we did things wrong. It seems like we’d do it again the same way you know everything we did is right, we were right to do it. So I’m asking you -- and I’m not asking about individual failings of soldiers or so -- but you were involved, you wrote a lot of important memos on, you know, that became part of law, if you want to say so, and now you’re Attorney General. Looking back on your work in the federal government, are there things you regret, you think you should have either done different in practical way or at least in a PR way? So are there any things that you think looking back you should have done differently?
A: Well, listen, yes, of course, there were decisions that were made that in hindsight and it’s always easy in hindsight to look back to see whether or not a recommendation or legal opinion was in fact the right one. But you have to understand something. I mean I’ve heard people, members of our Congress say how could you guys be so wrong, Supreme Court says the President has no authority to construct military commissions. You have to remember until, when was it, June 30th 2004, the position of the United States was the legal position. It had been upheld by the DC circuit. There were six opinions written in the Hamdan decision, six. 150 pages of analysis, these are difficult issues. We do the best we can as lawyers analyzing the precedent and giving recommendations to the decision makers. And the President’s views about the role of the courts is this, and that is the lawyers make the best informed judgment about what the law requires and then we make our recommendations to the President. He makes decisions based upon the recommendations. He understands that these are very difficult legal issues and that there are going to be times -- and then when the decision is made it’s up to the court whether or not we’ve made the right decision. In many cases the courts have said, yes, you made the right decision, and in some cases the courts have said no. But you know what, these are hard issues and sometimes you don’t get them right. Now we have an obligation to do the very best to try to anticipate as to what the right answer is of course ,but at the end of the day the Supreme Court and our courts make the decision as to what is required and then we can (inaudible) our conduct with the findings of our courts. So have we made mistakes, yes, we’ve made mistakes, and you know the thing is you identify the mistakes that are made, you correct the mistakes so they don’t happen again and then you move on. Now clearly some of the decisions that have been made by the United States, even the ones that are correct, even the ones that are lawful, have hurt America’s relationship around the world, and we do regret that. I mean I have serious disappointment about the notion that the United States and this President are not fully committed to the rule of law because we have worked so hard. The lawyers spent so much time looking at these issues to get it right. We care about the importance of the rule of law. It makes a difference to us about the views of the world community. The United States has traditionally been a beacon of hope. The leader of the world community in terms of commitment to the rule of law. It remains as committed today as it has been before September 11th and one of the messages that I want to give today is that very clear statement.
Q: My name is Johannes Timm, I’m with the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Thanks for being here and taking our questions. You’ve talked a lot about detention. You haven’t talked so much about interrogation. My question refers to the interpretation of the military commissions act. Do you consider forced hypothermia, standing for long hours, waterboarding -- do you consider these things outrageous upon personal dignity? Do you consider them grave breaches of the Geneva conventions? Thank you.
A: I think that the matters of questioning the United States is going to permit or is going to engage in should be clear to our interrogators but not clear to our enemy, not clear to Al Qaeda. And so we don’t talk about specific matters of questioning. The President of the United States has an obligation under the military commissions act to interpret the scope and application of our obligations under the Geneva conventions and to that there are in executive order, which will become published. So there will be some additional guidance given publicly in terms of the (inaudible) interpretation of what our legal obligations are under Common Article 3. But we have been very careful and have worked very hard to insure that our agents in the field and our soldiers on the battle field do not engage in interrogation methods that violate our domestic international legal obligations. Now, does that mean that it doesn’t happen? Well, sometimes things happen that are bad in combat. If you saw what happened -- the images we saw of Abu Ghraib, for example, completely unauthorized and completely unjustified which we have condemned, and things like that happen unfortunately. Ninety-nine percent of our soldiers in the battlefield they understand what the professional requirements are and what the professional standards are and they meet those requirements; but for those that don’t, when there are allegations of wrong doing, the difference is that the United States takes every allegation very seriously. We investigate those allegations, and when someone has not met the legal standard, then they are held to account.
Q: My name is Thomas Oppermann. I’m a member of the Deutsche Bundestag and I’m member of a committee that has to investigate so called renditions, CIA flights and so forth. Dear Attorney General, the most significant distinction between terrorist groups and democratic states is that democratic states are based on the rule of law. So why don’t we try to create new international law, a clear base like an amendment of the Geneva Convention. As you said it does not correctly fit to the situation. If you have a nation fighting terrorism, that is not the same situation like a nation vs. nation. So the Geneva Convention does not really allow to interrogate prisoners of war thoroughly on a criminal basis, it is complicated, that is why you had to create the new rules in Congress. Why don’t we create, try to create new international law, an amendment of the Geneva Convention (inaudible).
A: Let me begin with the second one. We haven’t had people brought into Guantanamo for quite, several months, for quite some time. The way the procedure would work is that someone would be, say, captured in Afghanistan and there would be an initial assessment as to their intelligence value and as to their dangerousness. And they would then typically be moved into a central holding location, say, Bagram air base. Again another assessment would be made as to their status, as to whether or not they should continue to be detained. Then a decision would be made as to whether or not they should be sent to Guantanamo. There at Guantanamo they would receive a Combatant Status Review Tribunal assessment, where they would have the opportunity to sort of hear the case against and they would have the opportunity to present their case. Then if the determination is made that they are, continue to remain an alien enemy combatant, they remain at Guantanamo. Every year there is an additional assessment, an annual review assessment by annual review board, where they would make another assessment as to whether or not they should continue to remain as an enemy combatant. So we have a very thorough process. As I indicated in my remarks more due process given to these people captured in the battlefield than any prisoner of war received during World War II, much more due process. Have mistakes happened? Yes, mistakes have happened in both ways, I suspect. Yes, there have been some people that because of changed circumstances, of new information, people are released and returned back to their home country, because their determination is made during that process that they should no longer detainees as an enemy combatant. And as I indicated in response to a question we’ve also made mistakes the other way, where we’ve released someone thinking, okay, they should (inaudible) or no longer (inaudible) and we determined that they come back to fight us; and so we have a very detailed process to assess that. With respect to your first question, I’m not here saying that we are not averse to a discussion. As I indicated there has been thinking about this in the United States government, I would say fairly informally but there is not a formal structure to look at this; but obviously we understand the anxiety, the tension that the policies and the tactics have created, and obviously if there is something that can be done to address that it should be explored. We need to, in the long haul as a partner, and so if there is an issue here that needs to be addressed obviously it’s something that we are going to be looking at, and we should continue to have a dialogue about whether or not there should be a different frame work, because this is something that will be with us unfortunately for quite some time.
Thank you again for having me. I appreciate it.
