Berlin
April 2, 2007

Press Attaché Robert Wood: Thank you for coming today. I don't think Assistant Secretary Fried needs any introduction, so let's get started right away. If you could state your name and media organization we would greatly appreciate it. Dan, would you like to make a few comments?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Sure. Thank you for coming here. You have me at a considerable disadvantage because, for scheduling reasons, I’m seeing you before I have met my German counterparts, so right off the plane. On the other hand, I don’t have to characterize meetings that haven’t happened yet. I came to Berlin for G-8 meetings. This is a G-8 Political Directors session. It’s starting tonight and going into tomorrow. But it’s also a chance to consult with my German colleagues about critical issues that we face together, and high on my own agenda and that of my German counterpart Michael Schaefer will be Kosovo, which I expect we will discuss this afternoon. Missile defense, obviously a fascinating topic -- and I will seek some advice from my German colleagues about how to approach this rather interesting public debate in Germany. Also, I imagine a number of regional and global topics will come up at the G-8 as they have in the past. The agendas are very broad, they include things like Iran, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, the frozen conflicts that are Abkhazia, South Caucasus, Moldova. So I expect a couple of days of intensive work; and tomorrow evening I will go to Bosnia, where I haven’t been in some time.

I and my American colleagues are visiting Kosovo’s neighbors because, as we approach final status decisions, it’s important to visit the countries in the region who will be most effected. I myself have been in Serbia and Macedonia recently. As I said, I will be in Bosnia tomorrow night, Wednesday and then going to Croatia later in the week. Other of my colleagues have been to Montenegro, and I expect to be traveling in the region.

Now with that I’ll be happy to take questions. And remember last week I spoke at the Foreign Press center in Washington about missile defense so you have my comments; I’ll spare from having to make them again. But if you have questions I’ll gladly repeat what I said and go even further if you can get it out of me.

Question: Noah Barkin from Reuters. Can you tell us your view on the Russian position on Kosovo? Is there a risk of a veto in the Security Council? Is the West doing anything to convince the Russians not to veto? Are there any bargaining chips on the table?

Assistant Secretary Fried: We are in close consultation with our Russian colleagues; indeed, we have been since the beginning. Russia is a full member of the so-called Contact Group, the group of countries including Germany, Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Russia. The Contact Group has been working for years on Kosovo issues. We together decided to support the launch of the Ahtisaari negotiations and hopefully we will come to decisions together and come to a consensus together about Kosovo’s final status. That said, you are perfectly correct that a Russian veto in the Security Council is possible. I can’t put a percentage figure on it. We think it is far better for everyone to work in the Security Council to come to a consensus. The prospect of resolving Kosovo’s final status without a Security Council resolution is grim. That is, all the options available without a Security Council resolution are worse than with one. So we certainly favor moving ahead with the Security Council and favor doing so together, as we have done. Now, it is also true that Russia very early in the process laid out some serious and, frankly, well-founded concerns about the future of the Kosovo-Serb community, and they did so in some detail. In the process of putting together Ahtisaari's proposals, the Russians concerns that I heard early in the process were taken into account and, in fact, about 90 percent Ahtisaari's proposal involves details for protection of the Kosovo-Serb community; and it’s that community and its future in Kosovo with which we need to be concerned. The Russians could quite rightly take credit for having successfully guided and successfully managed inputs to Ahtisaari's package in a way that provides very far-reaching protections for that community. They’d be perfectly justified in making that claim, and they would be right were they to do so. But we’re not quite there yet, we have a lot of work to do, and I look forward to working with the Russians.

Question: Johannes Leithäuser, Frankfurter Allgemeine. If we can stay on Kosovo for a while, do you think the European Union has missed a chance to offer Serbia better access to the Union, and in this way to ease the protests on the Serbian side? Can you expect the EU to do more on this?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, let me make two points. First, transatlantic unity and European unity are absolutely essential if this process is to succeed. Our unity will be critical in convincing Security Council members to move ahead and it will be critical in convincing the Kosovars and the Kosovar-Serbs in particular to have confidence in the process. As Kosovo reaches its final status -- and as you know, Ahtisaari's proposal includes the notion of supervised independence, which my government supports -- as this is reached, it is important to hold open to Serbia the prospect of a European future. The Serbs deserve this. They have been kept from Europe by nationalist politicians, they deserve to be part of Europe and it’s certainly the right thing to do. I don’t want to criticize the European Union at all. I think that the prospect -- that Europe has held open the prospect, the credible prospect, of the European future for Serbia. There is a debate in Europe about how the war crimes issue needs to be addressed and how Serbia’s obligation to hand over Radovan Karadzic in particular needs to be factored into this, but I think that a credible prospect of a European future is key, and I think we need to all be reaching out to Serbia during this period and after.

Question: Hubert Wetzel, Financial Times Deutschland: Sir, could you put a timeframe on when you would expect a decision by the Security Council, roughly. And another question, you spoke of European unity; there just was an informal EU Foreign Ministers meeting in Bremen over the weekend and the Slovak foreign minister, quite surprisingly, I thought, came out with remarks that mirror closely what the Russians say regarding Kosovo, saying there should be no solution that the Serbian side doesn’t accept. Do you see a split in the European Union on the issue?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I’ve had conversations with my Slovak friends and colleagues about this. European unity is critical, and one of the things I’ll be discussing with my German colleagues, the Presidency, and the EU, is how best to maintain this unity. As far as timing, I can’t say for sure but the Germans I believe have said that they want this decision to be made while they’re in their Presidency of the European Union is still maintained. So we’re looking at the coming weeks, couple of months ahead. But we’re not going to jam through a Security Council resolution without debate and without consultations, and right now the phase we’re in is that of intense consultations.

Question: I have two questions. Emily Harris, NPR. One, just following up, what do you, initially what are your ideas about what might be the best way to maintain European unity on Kosovo? And then, on missile defense, could you just spell out what your, what you see as the biggest challenge to the mixed response to missile defense in Germany is?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, on the question of European unity, the argument that key Europeans and Americans have been making for some time is that the status quo in Kosovo is not sustainable. We can’t keep going on like this with Kosovo in limbo after eight years of rule and administration by the United Nations. They deserve more clarity about their future, and further delay will destabilize the situation. One way or another, the status quo will end, and it will either end through a controlled, organized process that gives guarantees to the Kosovo-Serbs and a maximum of transparency and an orderly process, or it will be uncontrolled and much more violent. That’s the choice, and Europe has to recognize that violence in Kosovo is a threat to European security and will produce refugees and problems that Europe will have to absorb. So there are some problems that must be grappled with, and I think that there is an overwhelming consensus in Europe to grapple with them and the way that Ahtisaari lays out.

On missile defense, I think there is a real debate that needs to happen about the nature of early 21st century strategic threats, that is, the possibility that irresponsible countries will develop small but deadly arsenals of nuclear weapons and primitive, but sufficiently effective missiles as to be genuinely frightening. What is the best way to deal with that? Surely a combination, it seems to us Americans, that a combination of diplomacy, multilateral action, but also limited defenses may be the best combination. That’s a debate worth having. It is not particularly fruitful to go back and engage in a nostalgia-filled debate where we bat around slogans of 25 years ago. And that debate really doesn’t help address the problems we face and must face together.

Question: Can I just follow up on that, just to make sure I understood. You feel the best argument for persuading the European Union to unify on Kosovo is getting them to recognize the threat of fighting in the middle of Europe, potentially.

Assistant Secretary Fried: This problem, there are some problems that, like dead fish, do not improve with age and neglect. Kosovo is not going to get better if you just walk away from it. It will get worse. It will get very much worse. And we now have the most moderate, responsible Kosovar leadership imaginable. You have a Kosovo population which anticipates that they will have a final status conferred on them in relatively short order; most Kosovo-Serbs with whom I’ve met -- and I’ve met quite a number of Kosovo-Serb leaders -- are prepared to work with the Ahtisaari plan even if they don’t like the ultimate outcome. They want to make it work, they want to stay in Kosovo. We’ve got to move ahead. We’ve got to move ahead now while the conditions are the best they’re going to be. They will not improve with age.

Question: Thomas Nehls with German Public Radio, not National Public Radio. Two brief questions, if I may. Maybe it’s not a slogan but a concern here in Germany, talking about arms races started by the missile defense system. So what will be your answer to whoever regarding this connection, regarding this relationship that isn’t proven yet? And back to the transatlantic unity, what is your country going to do to avoid breaks or disturbances? Will it be an issue in the Russia-NATO Council and NATO at all, the defense system, not only in terms of announcing but consulting?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, in the first place, the United States and Russia are busy reducing our strategic nuclear arsenals down to levels so low they haven’t been seen in decades. Under the treaty of Moscow we’re going down by 2011, I believe, to between 1700 and 2200 warheads after about 10,000, between 10,000 and 15,000 during the height of the Cold War. So we’re engaged in radical arms reductions, which is altogether a good thing. First. Secondly, we have been consulting at NATO and through the NATO-Russia Council about missile defense for some time and we’ve been consulting with Russia bilaterally for some time. All of this is well known in Europe. The talk about arms race and militarization has a kind of anachronistic ring. We are after all talking about ten unarmed and very small missiles with no offensive capability whatsoever. And yes, I did say unarmed. They don’t have warheads of any kind, not conventional, not anything. The notion that these could suddenly pose a strategic threat to Russia is, pardon me, absurd. We have offered Russia cooperation, we have in fact done so through a formal statement we made at NATO last week, which offered cooperation with the Russians on missile defense programs and on transparency and compatibility of our systems. So altogether we believe that cooperation with Russia and cooperation in NATO to deal with these emerging new threats is a good thing. This is not unilateral, it is a multilateral approach that we have in mind, where you bring together national approaches, you bring together NATO programs, you bring together bilateral arrangements, cooperation with Russia -- all of which is designed to help us deal with emerging problems from Iran and that region.

Question: How can it be not unilateral when so many members disagree, I mean internally, or at least doubt?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, the debate is just beginning; but if you look at NATO’s communiqué from its last summit, you will see that it endorsed, NATO leaders endorsed NATO’s missile defense study, which referred to the threats emerging and said that short and medium range systems could provide a valuable service in dealing with these threats. So NATO has actually pronounced on missile defense in a positive way. There is a debate about the current bilateral discussions we plan to have with the Poles and the Czechs -- and I look forward to continuing that debate -- but it’s important that the debate be grounded in the reality of what’s planned and the reality of the threat and not simply harking back to things 20 years ago. Now, one final point. It is possible to defend the United States without any systems stationed in Europe. We can defend the continental United States in Alaska without the Polish and Czech forward-based systems altogether, but we cannot defend Europe without these systems; and we do not believe in multiple levels of security for the transatlantic community, and we don’t believe in decoupling American and European security. We believe that it will be a more stable world if the United States and Europe, if all of NATO, enjoys the same level of security, and that is really the strategic point behind what we’re planning to do with the Poles and the Czechs, if the Poles and the Czechs agree.

Question: Rüdiger Moniac, a freelancer here in Berlin. In this discussion are always mentioned also the countries United Kingdom and Denmark. Can you tell us and explain what roles these countries play?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, there are radar systems in Tule, in Greenland and in Fylingdales in the UK, which are part of the emerging American missile defense system. Now these radars would help defend the United States. They would not help defend Europe, and the thought of the Americans having a defense capability against, let us say, a small number of Iranian missiles but not Europe is not satisfactory to us. We don’t want to be secure where our allies are absolutely insecure. That does nothing for our common security. That would be a unilateral approach. That would be an approach of an isolationist America and the dangers of an isolationist America, the shortcomings of isolationism in America, were well demonstrated in the 20the century. We’re not going back to that.

Question: Last week a senior Russian foreign ministry official said that Russia would consider, or be ready, to host parts of the missile shield on its own territory. Is that something the U.S. could in any way consider some time, if the Russians came out publicly and said they wanted to (inaudible) be in on it?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I did notice that, that was an interesting statement. It was followed up a couple of days later by a statement that under no circumstances would Russia host American missile defense components on its territory, so I don’t know where the Russians stand. However, we do know that the Russians have welcomed the American offer of missile defense discussions and cooperation in principle. We answered that offer. President Bush and President Putin had a discussion about missile defense last week where President Bush expressed his willingness, his strong interest in missile defense cooperation with Russia. Last week, in a statement at NATO, the Americans, that is, we said we confirmed our interest in missile defense cooperation not only with NATO but with Russia, including bilateral cooperation, joint activity, including technology sharing, development of compatible systems, research and development, sharing of early warning data, and exercises between our forces. Now, that’s our public position. Let’s have discussions with the Russians, let’s see where these discussions lead to, let’s see if the Russians are genuinely interested. After all, if Iran is a problem for the United States in Europe, it’s also a problem for them. I think we ought to move ahead with cooperation.

Question: You just mentioned the telephone call between President Bush and President Putin. They had other issues as well, as far as I heard. If you take this as a flashlight on American Russian relations, how would you describe them at the moment, and would you think they have to be improved if you look to Iran and look, for instance, to the behavior Russia showed in the Security Council regarding the 15 captured British soldiers?

Assistant Secretary Fried: There are a lot of areas of good, concrete cooperation between the United States and Russia. Whether it is nuclear proliferation, Iran, counterterrorism, Russia’s progress toward the WTO, we are working together. In other areas, we have some differences with the Russians, with respect to the direction of Russian democratic development, with respect to other issues -- we’ve had differences about energy, about Russia’s relations with some of its neighbors. But we have good working ties with the Russians on all of these issues, including issues where we have differences with them and they have differences with us. We intend to keep working with the Russians to identify and develop areas of cooperation. In general, to sum up, we want to cooperate with Russia wherever we can, and where we have differences we will deal with these one issue at a time.

Question: If I may put my question again. We had Kosovo just now, and then the different approach in the Middle East, how to deal with Hamas, for instance, and differences on Iran as well, at least in some point, and how to regard the Iranian attack on 15 British soldiers, for instance?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, we certainly have at this point some differences of view about the way ahead on Kosovo. On Iran, we cooperated very well with the Russians on two Security Council resolutions; and I must say that the Russians throughout, and especially at the end-game on that second Iranian resolution, played a very constructive role. There are always going to be issues on which we have differences of view and we mustn't obsess with these but look for areas where we can work together where we can. And where we have differences with the Russians, we will deal with these one issue at a time.

Question: Where are, if at all, differences between Washington and Berlin? That's why you're here, too?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, I’m here because there is a G-8 meeting. Germany is the Presidency of the G-8. On Kosovo, we think German leadership both on a national level and as President of the European Union has been exemplary. Germany has some very strong experts and expertise on Kosovo and the Balkans generally. We respect that expertise, we work together on strategy and tactics, and I look forward to very productive discussions today and tomorrow. On missile defense, we’re trying to understand the German debate -- I must admit I don’t understand it myself. We also -- I look forward to having discussions with my German colleagues about Russia, both the areas where we are working well the Russians and the areas where we have differences. Obviously, on Iran, given the problem with the British military personnel being detained by Iran, we want to consult and show full solidarity with our British allies. So I’m looking forward to an intense couple of days of discussions, but we work with Germany as a good partner and work with Germany throughout the world.

Question: Sarah Kramer, I'm with the Tagesspiegel newspaper. I’ve got a question concerning Kosovo. Experts fear the European Union will not have enough capacity to build up good governance and civil society in Kosovo. What’s your take on that and how can your country help to give expertise?

Assistant Secretary Fried: After status, both the European Union and the United States need to do everything we can to support a viable Kosovo in the future. That will take a lot of work. It will take support for good governance, support for a better business climate and investment regime; it will take support for Kosovo institutions, which are now just barely getting started but are getting started; it will take work with the Serbian and other communities there, but particularly the Serbian communities so that they have the confidence to stay in Kosovo and build lives in the future. The United States cannot do this alone, the European Union can’t do this alone, NATO can’t do this alone. We’ve all got to be in this together working as hard as we can so that this works out -- and it well may. If we can get past the status decisions, there is every chance that Kosovo -- slowly, with many much back and forth and steps back along the way -- but every chance that Kosovo will succeed in the world; and, as all the countries in the Balkans start moving toward the European Union, these problems will seem less important.

Question: You mentioned WTO membership for Russia as one of the areas where the U.S. and Russia are working well together. Can you give a prediction about whether there could be some progress or success on that issue at the G-8 summit in June in Heiligendamm and can you talk at all to whether WTO membership could be used as some sort of bargaining chip in efforts to get Russia to play ball on Kosovo?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well, WTO is not bargaining chip, that is, you don’t give or withhold WTO membership on the basis of other issues. WTO is about itself, it does have its own criteria and we look forward to moving ahead. We have a bilateral agreement with the Russians which resolved the bilateral concerns we had. Now that needs to be implemented and Russia needs to work through the multilateral process, and I hope it happens as soon as possible. I hope accession happens as soon as possible.

Question: It was a bargaining chip on Iran, right?

Assistant Secretary Fried: No.

Question: The offer of the European … (inaudible)

Assistant Secretary Fried: Oh, the offer? Yes, America offered to open negotiations and, or not block negotiations, that Iran had on WTO membership. That doesn’t mean that we would have given it to them if they didn’t deserve it on the merits. We wouldn’t suspend the WTO conditions or give them a free ride, but the Europeans came to us and said, you ought not to withhold Iran from even the possibility of negotiating WTO membership, and the President thought about it and said, right, okay, and that decision was made in early 2005.

Question: On Iran, what is your take on why they seized these 15 UK servicemen and how it relates to the nuclear issue, and how do you think it’s going to be resolved?

Assistant Secretary Fried: I don’t know and I don’t know is the honest answer. I’m not an Iran expert and, unfortunately, the U.S. government is only now, after 25 years rebuilding -- it's over 25 years -- rebuilding its Iranian expertise as an institution. Some people who know more about Iran than I do have pointed out that, like the hostage crisis in 1979, the seizure of the British military appears to have something to do with Iranian domestic politics. These people are in the hands of more radical elements, it is said. I don’t know whether that is true but I’ve heard that argument made. I don’t know how it will be resolved. I certainly hope it is resolved swiftly and in ways that allows these 15 detained persons to be free unconditionally and, as I said, very soon.

Question: Could you comment on about what’s going with efforts between Europe and the U.S. to try to resolve it.

Assistant Secretary Fried: Other than to say that we’ve expressed full solidarity with the British, the European Union has expressed full solidarity with the British, no, I couldn’t say.

Q: I was a little surprised that said a veto by Russia on Kosovo is a possibility, because, as far as I remember, no real high level Russian official has ever publicly said the word veto in this (inaudible)?

Assistant Secretary Fried: The Russians have not threatened or indulged in that kind of, you know, threatening rhetoric about it, but you asked whether, or someone asked, whether there was a possibility of a veto. And what can one say, that there is no possibility of a veto? That would suggest that I had assurances that I don’t have. I don’t care to put, you know, start pinning odds on how this will come out, but yes, it remains a possibility. We hope that the Russians will continue to work with us and that we will find a consensus. We certainly are urging them to do so. Undersecretary Burns and Deputy Minister Titov met at length in New York this past Friday on Kosovo. They had a good, full discussion of the issue and there will be more contacts between the Americans and the Russians on this.

Question: Could you say whether it’s a slight possibility or a real possibility?

Assistant Secretary Fried: Well. Real as opposed to unreal? (laughter) No, the question was, is it a possibility? Yes, it is a possibility and it does no one any good to start putting labels on it. You can ask, but I don’t have to answer.

Thank you! Thanks for coming.

(End of press roundtable)