Audio File (mp3) 

Press Attaché Robert Wood:  I think you all know Assistant Secretary Fried, so I'm not going to bother going through an extended introduction, but he'll make some opening remarks and then take your questions; and if you could just -- for the Assistant Secretary -- just identify yourself and your news organization we would greatly appreciate it as always.  Dan, welcome again, good to have you here.  

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Morning everyone.  Thanks for coming out on an early Wednesday morning.  I was here in Germany for a conference on the Broader Middle East and Supportive Reform; they're a part of the G-8 BMENA initiative.  The Germans, as G-8 presidency, hosted this, and you had a fascinating and actually heartening dynamic of civil society groups from the Middle East at the table speaking directly to governments and calling for democratic reform, the rule of law, more open societies.  They were doing so in a way that received support from some governments around the table and indicates that the efforts of some of the G-8 countries to support reformers not only has an echo but is in fact being led by civil society in the region itself.  This is something which doesn't get a lot of news; it's, I will acknowledge, a commonplace to regard the Middle East as the home of extremists, and it is almost a cliché to write that, if elections are held, the only people who benefit are radical Islamists;  but the voices of a democratic, liberal civil society were heard yesterday.  Saad Eddin Ibrahim is a name well-known, he was there at the table; but many, many others were there and I just want to note that, while the attention in the media is often focused on other places, this initiative is proceeding.  There will be a ministerial conference in Sana in Yemen this December.

I'm also here in Germany for discussions with the Russians on CFE, to follow up the promising beginning we had in Moscow, now ten or twelve days ago, when Secretaries Rice and Gates, now famously, put forward some new and creative ideas on Missile Defense and CFE that the Russians acknowledged were constructive.  We'll see how much progress we can make today.  The United States, for its part, is determined to try to work with the Russians and develop common ground on Missile Defense and CFE.  With respect to CFE, we want to see the adapted treaty ratified.  That position is strongly shared by our NATO allies, and the United States is working very closely with our NATO allies, especially Germany, about next steps.  We hope that we can make progress, we want to see an end to the blockade that the CFE Treaty has suffered from, and we want to see a way -- we want to help Russia find a way to avoid suspending its obligations under the Treaty on December 12, which it has threatened to do.  If we can find a way forward, so much the better.

It also my pleasure to be able to talk to my German friends about a number of issues on which we have common interests, including Kosovo, relations with Russia generally, our support for Georgia's reforms and its sovereignty and its future, working with us all.  So it's good to be back in Germany again, I have a rich program, I'll be having more meetings today, as I said, with the Russians, then off tonight to Riga to meet Baltic and Nordic political directors.  So with that introduction, happy to take any and all questions.

Question:  Andreas Rinke, Handeslblatt newspaper.  Actually, I have several questions but I'll start with two.  First is Missile Defense.  Maybe you could explain to us what the position of the American government is.  Yesterday there were reports that you offered the Russians that you could stop -- that's what I understood -- stop the installation until the moment where you have concrete hints that the Iranians are capable of threatening Europe and the United States with long-range missiles.  Second, there are some reports about discussions going on in Washington about the Iran issue, if the American government should take a more firm stand against Iran; you know, what the U.S. president said about World War III that confused a lot of Europeans at least.  Maybe you could give us your explanation for that.

Assistant Secretary Fried:  On Missile Defense, I think Secretary Gates' remarks yesterday in Prague were very clear and completely consistent with our position that came out of the Moscow 2+2 discussions, and let me explain this.  Our Missile Defense program is intended to deal with an emerging threat from Iran, in the first instance.  There may be other countries - North Korea or others - in the future who develop these weapons.  We're making progress diplomatically with North Korea, so Iran is in our, is our principal concern.  But it is a threat-based program, that is our timing, the intensity of the program is a response to Iran's development of ballistic missiles and its nuclear weapons program, and it, our timing is a function of how we see the Iranian threat developing.  Now, Secretary Gates has made the point that if your program is threat-based, that is, in response to a threat, it's only logical that if that threat were attenuated, you would have to look, or you would have the opportunity to look at your program designed to counter the threat.  After all, you don't go on auto-pilot and just bureaucratically or mechanically continue what you're doing without regard to what's happening in the world.  This is rather commonsensical, and Secretary Gates has stated something both logical and obvious, but it's also important to state.  And what he said was, sort of in the next level of details, our discussions, our negotiations with the Poles and the Czechs will continue - we've made that clear, we won't stop; if these discussions, if our negotiations succeed, we will start the long and complicated process of actually putting in the installations - that take years, but I believe he said, and Secretary Rice has said, that the operationalization of the system is something that we would, a step we would take as the Iranian threat developed.  So I think that's logical and commonsensical, and we explained this to the Russians.  It doesn't mean that they get a veto over our programs, but it does mean we're going to be looking at the Iranian programs and making judgments and doing so in a transparent way.

Since there has been a great deal of concern expressed in Germany about all of this, I will say that since the spring the United States has reached out to Russia, we've proposed a strong, even unprecedented strategic cooperation with Russia on Missile Defense.  Secretaries Rice and Gates proposed that in Moscow about ten days ago.  We've also increased our efforts at bringing NATO into this system, or bringing our system into NATO, so that ideally, instead of an American national system alone, you could have a NATO system, the American system, a U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia system all integrated to the benefit of everyone's security and in a way that would not pose any threat to anyone at all.

With respect to Iran.  The President was pointing out that this is, the development of Iranian nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is a serious problem; it ought to be of concern to all of us.  Think about Ahmadinejad possessing nuclear weapons.  Just let that thought sink in.  The President was speaking about an underlying - I thought quite effectively - the gravity of the situation we may face, and therefore he was expressing the need to act now diplomatically to prevent something from developing which would pose a, give us a much difficult set of choices down the road.  All right?  Long answers to complicated questions but happy to do more.

Question:  Madeline Chambers from Reuters.  On the missile shield, do you think that your plans will be effective at all by the change in government or expected change in government in Poland?  Do you expect any delays?  And also, I wanted to ask about Turkey.  Shall I ask that now?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, let's do the Polish elections first.  First of all, the United States has worked well with Polish governments of every possible variety - right, left, center, peasant, all combinations - and we've worked well with all of them because we have, our relations with Poland rest on common interests and common values, so I look forward to working with the next Polish government and certainly congratulate Platforma on its excellent showing.  And, frankly, we are past the point that we need to remark that Poland has had another democratic election; that was news 15 years ago, it no longer is.  I don't expect, to answer your specific question, I don't expect there will be many changes.  The Kaczyński government was certainly, fielded some pretty tough negotiators.  It's not as if they were soft and I expect a sudden hard set of negotiators to come in, they were pretty, they were pretty tough.  We were working through issues systematically one at a time.  I think that the next team will approach this in a very professional and serious way.  I should also add that throughout the Missile Defense negotiating process, we were in contact with the opposition, both Platforma, the party that won, but also other opposition groups.  I myself briefed them on our plans, because we know from experience that it always pays to work with today's opposition, which is apt to be tomorrow's government.  So I expect that we will have some tough negotiating, but we've had that before, and I think the Poles will approach this in a serious and constructive manner.  Tough is not a euphemism for bad, tough means you just work through the things, the issues, systematically.  I also think that the Poles have been gratified by our efforts to increase NATO's involvement in this.  I will acknowledge that some of my Polish friends early on, including from Platforma, urged us to do exactly that.  We do listen to the Poles.  And, partly as a result of those kinds of consultations, we've intensified our work with NATO, done so rather successfully.  NATO allies last week were far more supportive of Missile Defense than they have ever been, mainly because they appreciated our forthcoming offers to Russia.  So I'm reasonably optimistic about the road ahead, and we'll take these things an issue at a time as the new Polish government comes online and is ready to work with us.

Question:  I'm Clemens Wergin, foreign policy editor of Die Welt.  Could you please name some of the concessions that you made to the Poles in the negotiation process?  Did the visa issue - Polish visas to the U.S. - come up?  What is (inaudible).

Assistant Secretary Fried:  The Poles have never linked the visa issue and their problems with our visa policy.  But they have pressed very hard - and this has been universal in Poland - for us to open up the Visa Waiver Program to them.  Frankly, partly as a result of Poland's pushing, we have opened up the Visa Waiver Program; there's new legislation which opens it up - not enough for Poland, and not enough for the American Administration.  We have said we want to work with Congress to open it up even more, but the law that Congress has passed gives us something to work with for.  We want, frankly, all of the countries in central and eastern Europe who are in the EU and in NATO to have access to the Visa Waiver Program when they've met new security requirements.  The law has some stipulations about visa refusal rates that we want to make a little more waivable, but, still, this is progress.  I look forward to the day when Poland is in the Visa Waiver Program.  I certainly have some personal commitment to this.  If when my grandfather came to the United States, there had been a visa requirement, he would never, ever, ever have received a U.S. visa.  So I, as a descendant like most Americans, of immigrants at one point or another, I have some personal sympathy for the Polish point of view.

Question:  Hans Maurus, German public radio.  Are we switching now?  Are there any other questions on Poland, because then …

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I'm happy to take anybody's questions, so fire away.

Question:  I'd like to come back to Missile Defense, just one follow-up.  Is there a position change now in tone or substance, or both?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, that's an odd … I don't know quite what to say …

Question:  That doesn't happen often (laughter) …

Assistant Secretary Fried:  … it is true, it is certainly true, that our commitment to Missile Defense stands because we think it is in the best interests of the United States and frankly of Europe as well that we not be absolutely vulnerable to whatever regime…to the possibility of a hostile regime developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them.  That is a thought which should give Europeans and Americans considerable pause, and the President spoke eloquently about that yesterday.  There is a security challenge which we think we can meet through Missile Defense and we want to do it in a multilateral, collaborative fashion working with NATO and working with Russia, if possible.  So there has been absolutely no change to that.

What we have said, what we have changed is our willingness to discuss in detail an offer of what Missile Defense cooperation means with Russia.  We've talked about it in general conceptual terms for months, but what was new is that, ten days ago, we rolled out for the Russians a detailed plan of what cooperation would look like.  That's new.  I don't know whether you call that a change or a logical extension, but it was certainly new.  It is also true that while a threat-based deployment of Missile Defense is an obvious one, it's fair to say that we hadn't spoken about that much before Secretaries Rice and Gates went to Moscow, the notion that, since Missile Defense is, since our Missile Defense program is a response to an Iranian and possibly other threats, that the intensification or the attenuation of such threats would have an impact on the operationalization of the system.  That's an obvious point if you think about it, but we had never actually articulated that publicly before.  If you want to record that as a change, I suppose you could.

I actually answered your questions, then?  Good.

Question:  Steffen Löwenstein from the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper.  Are there other details you offered to the Russians ten days ago?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  On Missile Defense?

Question:  Yes.

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, as I said, we offered a detailed plan of what a joint regional architecture of Missile Defense would look like.  Our military people did it, in fact General Obering, the head of the Missile Defense Agency, explained this in some detail and, basically, what he showed was that if we take the assets that President Putin, so to speak, put into play - the Gabala radar and the radar in, near Voronezh in southern Russia - if they were linked to the radar in the Czech Republic, and if the Russian ballistic missile system around Moscow were able to talk to, so to speak, our radar and our missile system in Poland, the effect would be to greatly increase security for Europe and Russia.  The ability of both systems to defend territory against incoming missiles would be greatly strengthened, and we showed them what this would look like, how the integration could work.  They were very interested in this, simply from a military point of view, but it was also clear that this was not a superficial briefing - we were getting into some serious details of the capabilities of the radar and the different, the way the Russian radars and the U.S. radars could work together.  This was quite an important briefing.  I am not aware that we have ever, ever presented to the Russians a briefing about such integrated security cooperation in the past.  I can't prove that, I have obviously not been present at all briefings to the Russians and before that the Soviets over decades, but this was an impressive and detailed set of discussions, and the Russians have acknowledged that it was important.  That doesn't mean they've agreed with us.  They still have a condition outstanding that we must freeze our discussions with the Poles and the Czechs, or suspend our discussions with the Poles and the Czechs.  We've said we won't do that.  But they've acknowledged that we've come up with some interesting ideas, and I hope to make progress.

Question:  Robin Mishra, Rheinischer Merkur newspaper.  There are other difficult issues between the United States and Russia.  Let me mention the Kosovo issue, where nobody really knows if the Russians will be constructive.  President Putin announced a new arms race that could come up in the next years; and there's the third question, if the Russians are willing to put additional pressure on Iran concerning the program.  Can you give some short notes on that, if there might be, if Russians and the United States might find a common position on these three issues?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I certainly hope so, in all cases.  We want to work with Russia to find a solution on Kosovo.  Right now the troika or U.S., European, and Russian negotiators are working hard to identify common ground between Serbia and Kosovo.  We hope they succeed.  We support the efforts of Wolfgang Ischinger, Frank Wisner, and Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko, the Russian.  I should say, since I'm in Germany, that I know Wolfgang very well, we have complete confidence in him.  I will give him credit for coming up with some creative ideas, they have our support.  There's no-one better equipped to do this than Wolfgang working with Frank Wisner and Botsan-Kharchenko.  If Frank and Wolfgang and Alexander can't do it, I don't think it can be done, frankly.  But we support their efforts and we hope that Russia will help.  I don't want to speculate about what happens after December 10.  Our position hasn't changed, but right now let's focus on developing common ground.

Arms race. Well, the Russians have said this, but frankly, the, you know, the Russians are building new ballistic missiles, we're not.  I don't see an arms race, because we are not worried about Russia as a strategic threat.  We regard Russia as a potential strategic partner, not a potential strategic threat, and our whole strategic approach to Russia is to work with them wherever possible.  We have some areas where we have differences; there are many areas where we have common interests.  We want to focus on the latter, manage the former as best we can.

With respect to Iran, we certainly acknowledge that we are much better off if we're working closely with Russia.  When Russia helped us achieve the two UN Security Council resolutions on Iran that we've already achieved, it got Iran's attention.  It is all to the good.  We hope to have even more Russian help, because Iran will listen to a united international community, and we are therefore all better off.  Secretary Rice gave a speech - I believe Monday - on U.S.-Russia relations, at the State Department, gave our latest thoughts about the complicated relationship between the United States and Russia, partly because Russia has a complicated view of its place in the world.  That's a different kind of a discussion, for longer, but our bottom line is we want to work with Russia wherever we can.

Question:  I would like to talk about the European position towards Iran.  President Sarkozy has suggested that the EU proceed with unilateral sanctions against Iran if the UN Security Council isn't coming forward with some more sanctions.  It seems that the Germans, Spanish and Italians are the ones who are trying to block this initiative.  What is your view on the European landscape when it comes to sanctions against Iran?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  The word unilateral is thrown around a lot.  Unilateral means one country off on its own.  If many countries are doing it, it's no longer unilateral.  Unilateral is often used, especially in Europe, as a euphemism for "dangerous," or "wicked," or "we really don't think this is legitimate" (laughter) and I just want to sort of expose what I consider to be a misuse of the word unilateral.  If it's many countries, it's multilateral.  We support a multilateral approach to Iran, and to putting economic pressure on Iran.  Unilateral - true unilateral, that is, America-only - approach, is not nearly as effective as working with the Europeans.  Is it better to work through the Security Council?  Why yes it is.  Yes it is.  But if the Security Council is blocked or slow, we have to consider working in parallel with the Europeans.  If the U.S. and Europe are doing something together, that's multilateral.  And we think that putting economic pressure on Iran is, can be effective, and it is important that we act together.  European often urge us in very strong terms not to contemplate military options, and it is absolutely the case that military options are all awful.  And if we agree with Europeans that it is better not to have to even approach this - which, and the Europeans are in this point right - then the logical next step is let's work together on the most robust possible economic and political moves to convince Iran it's on the, going down the wrong track.  And this is what we want to do on a multilateral basis.

Question: (Emily Harris, NPR)  I apologize, but I hope you haven't covered this specific question yet.  It's a return to relations with Russia and Missile Defense.  Two things that were reported that I wanted to check if they were accurate.  One, could you describe this idea of not perhaps turning on the Missile Defense system until there's an actual threat?  Would Russia be directly involved in determining whether there is a threat?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I already discussed this issue, but to clarify your last point:  We would not give Russia a veto; we would not ask Russia's permission to turn it on.  That would, that was never part of our thinking.  We would be perfectly happy to share with Russia our own sense of what the benchmarks would be of the developing threat, for example if Iran were flight-testing missiles of longer and longer range.  That could be a benchmark.  I'm not saying it is; I'm saying it's the kind of thing we could share with the Russians.  We could explain what our criteria were, talk to the Russians about the developing Iranian threat - which in fact we're doing in great detail, including through detailed intelligence exchanges with them - and we would certainly share with them our thinking.  In the end, I do not believe we would ever give Russia a veto over our decisions, but certainly transparency and collaboration in terms of discussing the threat and explaining our thinking is something which is very much in line what Secretaries Gates and Rice have said.

Question:  Can I follow up on that briefly?  On the same issue, you made it clear that the U.S. isn't going to stop negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic although Russia has that as a precondition.  That basic disagreement, how much of a cooperation-stopper is it?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, that depends on the Russians.  We've made clear that we want to cooperate with them, that we're quite serious about it, and earlier I was explaining some of the details of our proposal to the Russians for a joint regional architecture of missile defense.  This is pretty impressive stuff and the Russians are thinking about it.  We certainly think it's in their interest to work with us, we know it's in our interest to work with them, and they will have to make some decisions, and we're certainly willing to sit down with them and work through our thinking and listen to them and see if we can't come up with a way forward.

Question:  But you're going to keep going with Poland and Czech Republic, that's the bottom line?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  We have certainly said so repeatedly and I'm not saying anything else right now.  That's our position.

Question:  I have a question concerning the Near East conference which is planned for November in the United States.  Obviously, here in Berlin and some other capitals in Europe, there is concern that the Europeans might not be at the negotiating table.  Could you tell us if they are going to be invited, or is it just the United States and regional players in the Near East?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  It will, I strongly suspect it will be more than just the United States and regional players.  We've been working very well with the Quartet, but right now this is something that we're working through.  I'm not best placed to start speculating about who might or might not be invited to this, but I very much doubt that it will be just the United States and the countries in the region.

Question:  Can we move on to Turkey?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Please.

Question:  Are you confident you can persuade the Turks not to go into northern Iraq on a big scale?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, the issue not us holding back the Turks.  The question is how to deal with the challenge of these outrageous PKK attacks on Turkey which have understandably inflamed public opinion.  The Turks are angry, but they are not acting simply on the basis of emotion - they are acting on the basis of a thoughtful approach to their national interest and a serious look at the options available, none of which is particularly easy.  So we have to give important credit to the Turkish government for thinking its way through this problem under the pressure of outrageous and intensified terrorist attacks.  Iraq has to do more, both the Iraqi authorities and the Kurdish regional government need to do more.  I've heard some initial reports that Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan's trip to Baghdad has yielded some results.  I certainly hope so.  The way forward is certainly through Iraqi-Turkish cooperation, including Kurdish regional government cooperation against the PKK terrorists, and the United States also has a role to play here.  So it's not simply a question of the United States pulling back the Turks, it's a question of how we solve the problem.  After all, if any country were under repeated attack from terrorists, it would react strongly, and, ironically, this Turkish government is one of the most forward-looking and progressive in terms of Kurdish ethnic issues in Turkey.  (Inaudible) Party received a lot of votes from the Kurds in the recent, from Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnicity in the recent elections, so it's not a nationalist party or an anti-Kurdish party.  Maybe that's one reason, I can't speculate with knowledge, but it may be a reason with the PKK extremists and terrorists are attacking, because they know that this government has the political capability and will to reach out to all citizens of Turkey, including Kurdish citizens.

Question:  The Turkish government has something like 100,000 troops along the border.  If there's going to be an escalation, which is highly likely, could that lead to further destabilization of Iraq?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  There are a number of scenarios which would be very troubling.  I don't want to speculate about this.  The challenge now is to do whatever possible to curb the, to stop the PKK attacks against Turkey and to do so in a way which will be stabilizing.  In northern Iraq, the Kurdish ethnic area is one of the most prosperous and stable, almost certainly the most stable area, in Iraq.  It's been a real success.  Turkey has been key to that success.  It is in the interests of the Kurdish citizens of Iraq that these terrorist attacks stop and that Turkey and Iraq become good neighbors in fact, not just in theory.  This is important, this is the challenge and we're working along these lines.  Secretary Rice has been reaching out to the Iraqi leadership, including the Turks - and of course with the Turkish government, and so has President Bush.  We very much hope to see progress and progress soon.  It's an urgent situation.

Question:  On Turkey still, is there anything specific that U.S. can do to stop the PKK, and what are your best arguments to Turkey?  You've expressed obviously that they're responding to the direct action and terrorist attacks, what are your best arguments to Turkey to restrain themselves?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I have been in Ankara recently with Under Secretary Adelman.  Our message to the Turks was, we share your outrage about these PKK attacks; we understand the concern, the anger of the Turkish people, and we want to, and we know you are thinking through your options, and we want to work with you as you do.  We were not there to lecture the Turks to "get over it."  We were there to support them in their desire to think this through and come up with options that make sense.  If there were a magic solution, if there could be one act on the part of Turkey or the United States or the Iraqi government to end this problem, it would be easy.  There is no single act that can be done; therefore we have to find the best combination of measures to deal with this problem in the most effective way.  It's not an easy problem, as the Turks know.  It's not as if we're lecturing them.  They know how complicated it is and they are looking through their options.  Our job is to help them in a way that makes sense and encourage the Iraqi authorities to do what they must do.

Question:  Any specifics on options?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, there are specifics we are thinking about and as I left Washington Monday we were thinking them through, but it is in the nature of such things that you don't discuss them publicly, ever, in advance. 

Question:  Sebastian Hesse with German public radio as well.  Next weekend we're having the party convention of the Social Democratic Party.  One of the issues is Afghanistan and there might even be a vote on stepping out of OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom).  How closely does the U.S. government follow that, how worried are you about it, and is there any communication gap about all the criticism that OEF draws? 

Assistant Secretary Fried:  My colleague from the Defense Department Mary Beth Long was here just the other day and spoke with a great number of German parliamentary deputies, including Social Democrats, about OEF and what it does.  There is a certain misunderstanding in the German media about this.  Most of what OEF does is training the Afghan forces.  Its own operations are a very small portion of its activities.  There are issues of civilian casualties, and we've changed some of the procedures and, as a result, the problem has diminished, which is good.  We want to work, well, as allies have found out, it's one thing to demand that military operations be perfectly conducted and it's another thing actually to, you know, to have to do that.  Some Europeans doing the fighting, particularly in the South, have discovered that the hard way.  But we need to, let's stipulate that we need to do, all of us need to do a better job in Afghanistan, whether it's continuing to knit together our civilian and military elements because success comes from both combined, not through purely military actions; we need to do more to help the Afghan government extend its good governance; we have to intensify our counter-narcotics efforts; we have to do more along the border.  So let's stipulate that there's a lot of work to do, and I don't mind Germany coming in with ideas about how to do it better.  But we certainly hope that pulling out of OEF is an option which Germans and the Social Democrats will see does nothing.  We're in Afghanistan for good reasons.  We need to stay there and get the job done.  Do we need to do it better?  Yes, we do.  Do we need to pull out?  Well, think about the consequences.  Pulling out does what exactly?  What happens in five years, what happens in ten years?  And haven't we seen this movie before?  Don't we know how it ends?  There are consequences, and those who advocate pulling out have to consider not just a position that makes them feel good and pure and absolves them of making hard decisions, but have to consider what would happen if everyone did as they advise.  Sometimes it's easy just to think to yourselves, I'll pull out and not have to face hard choices and then let the Americans do it, and if things go wrong I can always criticize them then.  Well, I thought we were past unilateralism.  We want a multilateral approach.  That means a certain solidarity.  It's hard for Germany; I appreciate what Germany has one.  You know, German troops in the Hindu Kush and all of that.  But the challenges to our security are going to come in unexpected ways and in far-flung areas; we have to get better at how we handle them.  Better.  That means maybe I'm saying we haven't done it well enough.  Okay.  But we have to do it.  We have to learn how to do this better as an alliance multilaterally.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak on this.

Press Attaché Robert Wood:  We have time for one, maybe two questions.  Do you want to follow up on that?

Question:  Also on Afghanistan.  If not pulling out, is the fusion of OEF and ISAF an option for you?  I remember well the U.S. wanted it once and the Germans were among those against?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, you're quite right that Germany wanted to keep them separate and we agreed, at the request of the German government, to keep them separate.  Okay, Germany made a reasonable argument, we're all for that.  We're looking at ways -he question is, what actually works better, what makes us more effective, what gives us a better chance of reducing the problems?  And at that point I'll be guided by the advice of military commanders in the field, of Ambassador Wood, and others in Afghanistan.  So we're certainly open to discussing the issue, but we've taken the advice of our German colleagues seriously in this, and we will continue to do so.

Press Attaché Robert Wood:  One last quick question?

Question:  A short one.  In talking with the Russians, was there a presentation made that tied Kosovo, the CFE, and …

Assistant Secretary Fried:  No (laughter).  No, the reports that Kosovo was somehow tied in are just wrong.  Kosovo didn't come up at the 2+2 at all.  At all.  Therefore I could answer, no.

Question:  Or the CFE?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, CFE certainly did come up.  I was saying no to the question you asked not the question you didn't ask.

Question:  You answered before I said CFE!

Assistant Secretary Fried:  The answer would have still been no.  On CFE, however, yes, these were the two principle issues on the agenda:  CFE, Missile Defense, also post-S.T.A.R.T.  And it is true that they are all, they can all be considered part of a strategic basket of issues in which - and the Russians want to make progress, or at least we do, and I believe the Russians do.  And it is certainly true that if we can bring these issues together and cooperate broadly on a set of strategic issues, that may make it easier to resolve them.  So, that's fair.  But what I said no to was throwing Kosovo into the mix.  That's a tough issue by itself, and I don't see how one does trade-offs, that doesn't make any sense, and so it didn't come up at all in Moscow.

All right.  Well, thank you very much.

Press Attaché Robert Wood:  Thank you, Dan.

(end of press roundtable)

I'm also here in Germany for discussions with the Russians on CFE, to follow up the promising beginning we had in Moscow, now ten or twelve days ago, when Secretaries Rice and Gates, now famously, put forward some new and creative ideas on Missile Defense and CFE that the Russians acknowledged were constructive.  We'll see how much progress we can make today.  The United States, for its part, is determined to try to work with the Russians and develop common ground on Missile Defense and CFE.  With respect to CFE, we want to see the adapted treaty ratified.  That position is strongly shared by our NATO allies, and the United States is working very closely with our NATO allies, especially Germany, about next steps.  We hope that we can make progress, we want to see an end to the blockade that the CFE Treaty has suffered from, and we want to see a way -- we want to help Russia find a way to avoid suspending its obligations under the Treaty on December 12, which it has threatened to do.  If we can find a way forward, so much the better.

It also my pleasure to be able to talk to my German friends about a number of issues on which we have common interests, including Kosovo, relations with Russia generally, our support for Georgia's reforms and its sovereignty and its future, working with us all.  So it's good to be back in Germany again, I have a rich program, I'll be having more meetings today, as I said, with the Russians, then off tonight to Riga to meet Baltic and Nordic political directors.  So with that introduction, happy to take any and all questions.

Question:  Andreas Rinke, Handeslblatt newspaper.  Actually, I have several questions but I'll start with two.  First is Missile Defense.  Maybe you could explain to us what the position of the American government is.  Yesterday there were reports that you offered the Russians that you could stop -- that's what I understood -- stop the installation until the moment where you have concrete hints that the Iranians are capable of threatening Europe and the United States with long-range missiles.  Second, there are some reports about discussions going on in Washington about the Iran issue, if the American government should take a more firm stand against Iran; you know, what the U.S. president said about World War III that confused a lot of Europeans at least.  Maybe you could give us your explanation for that.

Assistant Secretary Fried:  On Missile Defense, I think Secretary Gates' remarks yesterday in Prague were very clear and completely consistent with our position that came out of the Moscow 2+2 discussions, and let me explain this.  Our Missile Defense program is intended to deal with an emerging threat from Iran, in the first instance.  There may be other countries - North Korea or others - in the future who develop these weapons.  We're making progress diplomatically with North Korea, so Iran is in our, is our principal concern.  But it is a threat-based program, that is our timing, the intensity of the program is a response to Iran's development of ballistic missiles and its nuclear weapons program, and it, our timing is a function of how we see the Iranian threat developing.  Now, Secretary Gates has made the point that if your program is threat-based, that is, in response to a threat, it's only logical that if that threat were attenuated, you would have to look, or you would have the opportunity to look at your program designed to counter the threat.  After all, you don't go on auto-pilot and just bureaucratically or mechanically continue what you're doing without regard to what's happening in the world.  This is rather commonsensical, and Secretary Gates has stated something both logical and obvious, but it's also important to state.  And what he said was, sort of in the next level of details, our discussions, our negotiations with the Poles and the Czechs will continue - we've made that clear, we won't stop; if these discussions, if our negotiations succeed, we will start the long and complicated process of actually putting in the installations - that take years, but I believe he said, and Secretary Rice has said, that the operationalization of the system is something that we would, a step we would take as the Iranian threat developed.  So I think that's logical and commonsensical, and we explained this to the Russians.  It doesn't mean that they get a veto over our programs, but it does mean we're going to be looking at the Iranian programs and making judgments and doing so in a transparent way.

Since there has been a great deal of concern expressed in Germany about all of this, I will say that since the spring the United States has reached out to Russia, we've proposed a strong, even unprecedented strategic cooperation with Russia on Missile Defense.  Secretaries Rice and Gates proposed that in Moscow about ten days ago.  We've also increased our efforts at bringing NATO into this system, or bringing our system into NATO, so that ideally, instead of an American national system alone, you could have a NATO system, the American system, a U.S.-Russia or NATO-Russia system all integrated to the benefit of everyone's security and in a way that would not pose any threat to anyone at all.

With respect to Iran.  The President was pointing out that this is, the development of Iranian nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is a serious problem; it ought to be of concern to all of us.  Think about Ahmadinejad possessing nuclear weapons.  Just let that thought sink in.  The President was speaking about an underlying - I thought quite effectively - the gravity of the situation we may face, and therefore he was expressing the need to act now diplomatically to prevent something from developing which would pose a, give us a much difficult set of choices down the road.  All right?  Long answers to complicated questions but happy to do more.

Question:  Madeline Chambers from Reuters.  On the missile shield, do you think that your plans will be effective at all by the change in government or expected change in government in Poland?  Do you expect any delays?  And also, I wanted to ask about Turkey.  Shall I ask that now?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, let's do the Polish elections first.  First of all, the United States has worked well with Polish governments of every possible variety - right, left, center, peasant, all combinations - and we've worked well with all of them because we have, our relations with Poland rest on common interests and common values, so I look forward to working with the next Polish government and certainly congratulate Platforma on its excellent showing.  And, frankly, we are past the point that we need to remark that Poland has had another democratic election; that was news 15 years ago, it no longer is.  I don't expect, to answer your specific question, I don't expect there will be many changes.  The Kaczyński government was certainly, fielded some pretty tough negotiators.  It's not as if they were soft and I expect a sudden hard set of negotiators to come in, they were pretty, they were pretty tough.  We were working through issues systematically one at a time.  I think that the next team will approach this in a very professional and serious way.  I should also add that throughout the Missile Defense negotiating process, we were in contact with the opposition, both Platforma, the party that won, but also other opposition groups.  I myself briefed them on our plans, because we know from experience that it always pays to work with today's opposition, which is apt to be tomorrow's government.  So I expect that we will have some tough negotiating, but we've had that before, and I think the Poles will approach this in a serious and constructive manner.  Tough is not a euphemism for bad, tough means you just work through the things, the issues, systematically.  I also think that the Poles have been gratified by our efforts to increase NATO's involvement in this.  I will acknowledge that some of my Polish friends early on, including from Platforma, urged us to do exactly that.  We do listen to the Poles.  And, partly as a result of those kinds of consultations, we've intensified our work with NATO, done so rather successfully.  NATO allies last week were far more supportive of Missile Defense than they have ever been, mainly because they appreciated our forthcoming offers to Russia.  So I'm reasonably optimistic about the road ahead, and we'll take these things an issue at a time as the new Polish government comes online and is ready to work with us.

Question:  I'm Clemens Wergin, foreign policy editor of Die Welt.  Could you please name some of the concessions that you made to the Poles in the negotiation process?  Did the visa issue - Polish visas to the U.S. - come up?  What is (inaudible).

Assistant Secretary Fried:  The Poles have never linked the visa issue and their problems with our visa policy.  But they have pressed very hard - and this has been universal in Poland - for us to open up the Visa Waiver Program to them.  Frankly, partly as a result of Poland's pushing, we have opened up the Visa Waiver Program; there's new legislation which opens it up - not enough for Poland, and not enough for the American Administration.  We have said we want to work with Congress to open it up even more, but the law that Congress has passed gives us something to work with for.  We want, frankly, all of the countries in central and eastern Europe who are in the EU and in NATO to have access to the Visa Waiver Program when they've met new security requirements.  The law has some stipulations about visa refusal rates that we want to make a little more waivable, but, still, this is progress.  I look forward to the day when Poland is in the Visa Waiver Program.  I certainly have some personal commitment to this.  If when my grandfather came to the United States, there had been a visa requirement, he would never, ever, ever have received a U.S. visa.  So I, as a descendant like most Americans, of immigrants at one point or another, I have some personal sympathy for the Polish point of view.

Question:  Hans Maurus, German public radio.  Are we switching now?  Are there any other questions on Poland, because then …

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I'm happy to take anybody's questions, so fire away.

Question:  I'd like to come back to Missile Defense, just one follow-up.  Is there a position change now in tone or substance, or both?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, that's an odd … I don't know quite what to say …

Question:  That doesn't happen often (laughter) …

Assistant Secretary Fried:  … it is true, it is certainly true, that our commitment to Missile Defense stands because we think it is in the best interests of the United States and frankly of Europe as well that we not be absolutely vulnerable to whatever regime…to the possibility of a hostile regime developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to deliver them.  That is a thought which should give Europeans and Americans considerable pause, and the President spoke eloquently about that yesterday.  There is a security challenge which we think we can meet through Missile Defense and we want to do it in a multilateral, collaborative fashion working with NATO and working with Russia, if possible.  So there has been absolutely no change to that.

What we have said, what we have changed is our willingness to discuss in detail an offer of what Missile Defense cooperation means with Russia.  We've talked about it in general conceptual terms for months, but what was new is that, ten days ago, we rolled out for the Russians a detailed plan of what cooperation would look like.  That's new.  I don't know whether you call that a change or a logical extension, but it was certainly new.  It is also true that while a threat-based deployment of Missile Defense is an obvious one, it's fair to say that we hadn't spoken about that much before Secretaries Rice and Gates went to Moscow, the notion that, since Missile Defense is, since our Missile Defense program is a response to an Iranian and possibly other threats, that the intensification or the attenuation of such threats would have an impact on the operationalization of the system.  That's an obvious point if you think about it, but we had never actually articulated that publicly before.  If you want to record that as a change, I suppose you could.

I actually answered your questions, then?  Good.

Question:  Steffen Löwenstein from the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper.  Are there other details you offered to the Russians ten days ago?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  On Missile Defense?

Question:  Yes.

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, as I said, we offered a detailed plan of what a joint regional architecture of Missile Defense would look like.  Our military people did it, in fact General Obering, the head of the Missile Defense Agency, explained this in some detail and, basically, what he showed was that if we take the assets that President Putin, so to speak, put into play - the Gabala radar and the radar in, near Voronezh in southern Russia - if they were linked to the radar in the Czech Republic, and if the Russian ballistic missile system around Moscow were able to talk to, so to speak, our radar and our missile system in Poland, the effect would be to greatly increase security for Europe and Russia.  The ability of both systems to defend territory against incoming missiles would be greatly strengthened, and we showed them what this would look like, how the integration could work.  They were very interested in this, simply from a military point of view, but it was also clear that this was not a superficial briefing - we were getting into some serious details of the capabilities of the radar and the different, the way the Russian radars and the U.S. radars could work together.  This was quite an important briefing.  I am not aware that we have ever, ever presented to the Russians a briefing about such integrated security cooperation in the past.  I can't prove that, I have obviously not been present at all briefings to the Russians and before that the Soviets over decades, but this was an impressive and detailed set of discussions, and the Russians have acknowledged that it was important.  That doesn't mean they've agreed with us.  They still have a condition outstanding that we must freeze our discussions with the Poles and the Czechs, or suspend our discussions with the Poles and the Czechs.  We've said we won't do that.  But they've acknowledged that we've come up with some interesting ideas, and I hope to make progress.

Question:  Robin Mishra, Rheinischer Merkur newspaper.  There are other difficult issues between the United States and Russia.  Let me mention the Kosovo issue, where nobody really knows if the Russians will be constructive.  President Putin announced a new arms race that could come up in the next years; and there's the third question, if the Russians are willing to put additional pressure on Iran concerning the program.  Can you give some short notes on that, if there might be, if Russians and the United States might find a common position on these three issues?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I certainly hope so, in all cases.  We want to work with Russia to find a solution on Kosovo.  Right now the troika or U.S., European, and Russian negotiators are working hard to identify common ground between Serbia and Kosovo.  We hope they succeed.  We support the efforts of Wolfgang Ischinger, Frank Wisner, and Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko, the Russian.  I should say, since I'm in Germany, that I know Wolfgang very well, we have complete confidence in him.  I will give him credit for coming up with some creative ideas, they have our support.  There's no-one better equipped to do this than Wolfgang working with Frank Wisner and Botsan-Kharchenko.  If Frank and Wolfgang and Alexander can't do it, I don't think it can be done, frankly.  But we support their efforts and we hope that Russia will help.  I don't want to speculate about what happens after December 10.  Our position hasn't changed, but right now let's focus on developing common ground.

Arms race. Well, the Russians have said this, but frankly, the, you know, the Russians are building new ballistic missiles, we're not.  I don't see an arms race, because we are not worried about Russia as a strategic threat.  We regard Russia as a potential strategic partner, not a potential strategic threat, and our whole strategic approach to Russia is to work with them wherever possible.  We have some areas where we have differences; there are many areas where we have common interests.  We want to focus on the latter, manage the former as best we can.

With respect to Iran, we certainly acknowledge that we are much better off if we're working closely with Russia.  When Russia helped us achieve the two UN Security Council resolutions on Iran that we've already achieved, it got Iran's attention.  It is all to the good.  We hope to have even more Russian help, because Iran will listen to a united international community, and we are therefore all better off.  Secretary Rice gave a speech - I believe Monday - on U.S.-Russia relations, at the State Department, gave our latest thoughts about the complicated relationship between the United States and Russia, partly because Russia has a complicated view of its place in the world.  That's a different kind of a discussion, for longer, but our bottom line is we want to work with Russia wherever we can.

Question:  I would like to talk about the European position towards Iran.  President Sarkozy has suggested that the EU proceed with unilateral sanctions against Iran if the UN Security Council isn't coming forward with some more sanctions.  It seems that the Germans, Spanish and Italians are the ones who are trying to block this initiative.  What is your view on the European landscape when it comes to sanctions against Iran?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  The word unilateral is thrown around a lot.  Unilateral means one country off on its own.  If many countries are doing it, it's no longer unilateral.  Unilateral is often used, especially in Europe, as a euphemism for "dangerous," or "wicked," or "we really don't think this is legitimate" (laughter) and I just want to sort of expose what I consider to be a misuse of the word unilateral.  If it's many countries, it's multilateral.  We support a multilateral approach to Iran, and to putting economic pressure on Iran.  Unilateral - true unilateral, that is, America-only - approach, is not nearly as effective as working with the Europeans.  Is it better to work through the Security Council?  Why yes it is.  Yes it is.  But if the Security Council is blocked or slow, we have to consider working in parallel with the Europeans.  If the U.S. and Europe are doing something together, that's multilateral.  And we think that putting economic pressure on Iran is, can be effective, and it is important that we act together.  European often urge us in very strong terms not to contemplate military options, and it is absolutely the case that military options are all awful.  And if we agree with Europeans that it is better not to have to even approach this - which, and the Europeans are in this point right - then the logical next step is let's work together on the most robust possible economic and political moves to convince Iran it's on the, going down the wrong track.  And this is what we want to do on a multilateral basis.

Question: (Emily Harris, NPR)  I apologize, but I hope you haven't covered this specific question yet.  It's a return to relations with Russia and Missile Defense.  Two things that were reported that I wanted to check if they were accurate.  One, could you describe this idea of not perhaps turning on the Missile Defense system until there's an actual threat?  Would Russia be directly involved in determining whether there is a threat?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I already discussed this issue, but to clarify your last point:  We would not give Russia a veto; we would not ask Russia's permission to turn it on.  That would, that was never part of our thinking.  We would be perfectly happy to share with Russia our own sense of what the benchmarks would be of the developing threat, for example if Iran were flight-testing missiles of longer and longer range.  That could be a benchmark.  I'm not saying it is; I'm saying it's the kind of thing we could share with the Russians.  We could explain what our criteria were, talk to the Russians about the developing Iranian threat - which in fact we're doing in great detail, including through detailed intelligence exchanges with them - and we would certainly share with them our thinking.  In the end, I do not believe we would ever give Russia a veto over our decisions, but certainly transparency and collaboration in terms of discussing the threat and explaining our thinking is something which is very much in line what Secretaries Gates and Rice have said.

Question:  Can I follow up on that briefly?  On the same issue, you made it clear that the U.S. isn't going to stop negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic although Russia has that as a precondition.  That basic disagreement, how much of a cooperation-stopper is it?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, that depends on the Russians.  We've made clear that we want to cooperate with them, that we're quite serious about it, and earlier I was explaining some of the details of our proposal to the Russians for a joint regional architecture of missile defense.  This is pretty impressive stuff and the Russians are thinking about it.  We certainly think it's in their interest to work with us, we know it's in our interest to work with them, and they will have to make some decisions, and we're certainly willing to sit down with them and work through our thinking and listen to them and see if we can't come up with a way forward.

Question:  But you're going to keep going with Poland and Czech Republic, that's the bottom line?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  We have certainly said so repeatedly and I'm not saying anything else right now.  That's our position.

Question:  I have a question concerning the Near East conference which is planned for November in the United States.  Obviously, here in Berlin and some other capitals in Europe, there is concern that the Europeans might not be at the negotiating table.  Could you tell us if they are going to be invited, or is it just the United States and regional players in the Near East?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  It will, I strongly suspect it will be more than just the United States and regional players.  We've been working very well with the Quartet, but right now this is something that we're working through.  I'm not best placed to start speculating about who might or might not be invited to this, but I very much doubt that it will be just the United States and the countries in the region.

Question:  Can we move on to Turkey?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Please.

Question:  Are you confident you can persuade the Turks not to go into northern Iraq on a big scale?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, the issue not us holding back the Turks.  The question is how to deal with the challenge of these outrageous PKK attacks on Turkey which have understandably inflamed public opinion.  The Turks are angry, but they are not acting simply on the basis of emotion - they are acting on the basis of a thoughtful approach to their national interest and a serious look at the options available, none of which is particularly easy.  So we have to give important credit to the Turkish government for thinking its way through this problem under the pressure of outrageous and intensified terrorist attacks.  Iraq has to do more, both the Iraqi authorities and the Kurdish regional government need to do more.  I've heard some initial reports that Turkish Foreign Minister Babacan's trip to Baghdad has yielded some results.  I certainly hope so.  The way forward is certainly through Iraqi-Turkish cooperation, including Kurdish regional government cooperation against the PKK terrorists, and the United States also has a role to play here.  So it's not simply a question of the United States pulling back the Turks, it's a question of how we solve the problem.  After all, if any country were under repeated attack from terrorists, it would react strongly, and, ironically, this Turkish government is one of the most forward-looking and progressive in terms of Kurdish ethnic issues in Turkey.  (Inaudible) Party received a lot of votes from the Kurds in the recent, from Turkish citizens of Kurdish ethnicity in the recent elections, so it's not a nationalist party or an anti-Kurdish party.  Maybe that's one reason, I can't speculate with knowledge, but it may be a reason with the PKK extremists and terrorists are attacking, because they know that this government has the political capability and will to reach out to all citizens of Turkey, including Kurdish citizens.

Question:  The Turkish government has something like 100,000 troops along the border.  If there's going to be an escalation, which is highly likely, could that lead to further destabilization of Iraq?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  There are a number of scenarios which would be very troubling.  I don't want to speculate about this.  The challenge now is to do whatever possible to curb the, to stop the PKK attacks against Turkey and to do so in a way which will be stabilizing.  In northern Iraq, the Kurdish ethnic area is one of the most prosperous and stable, almost certainly the most stable area, in Iraq.  It's been a real success.  Turkey has been key to that success.  It is in the interests of the Kurdish citizens of Iraq that these terrorist attacks stop and that Turkey and Iraq become good neighbors in fact, not just in theory.  This is important, this is the challenge and we're working along these lines.  Secretary Rice has been reaching out to the Iraqi leadership, including the Turks - and of course with the Turkish government, and so has President Bush.  We very much hope to see progress and progress soon.  It's an urgent situation.

Question:  On Turkey still, is there anything specific that U.S. can do to stop the PKK, and what are your best arguments to Turkey?  You've expressed obviously that they're responding to the direct action and terrorist attacks, what are your best arguments to Turkey to restrain themselves?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  I have been in Ankara recently with Under Secretary Adelman.  Our message to the Turks was, we share your outrage about these PKK attacks; we understand the concern, the anger of the Turkish people, and we want to, and we know you are thinking through your options, and we want to work with you as you do.  We were not there to lecture the Turks to "get over it."  We were there to support them in their desire to think this through and come up with options that make sense.  If there were a magic solution, if there could be one act on the part of Turkey or the United States or the Iraqi government to end this problem, it would be easy.  There is no single act that can be done; therefore we have to find the best combination of measures to deal with this problem in the most effective way.  It's not an easy problem, as the Turks know.  It's not as if we're lecturing them.  They know how complicated it is and they are looking through their options.  Our job is to help them in a way that makes sense and encourage the Iraqi authorities to do what they must do.

Question:  Any specifics on options?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, there are specifics we are thinking about and as I left Washington Monday we were thinking them through, but it is in the nature of such things that you don't discuss them publicly, ever, in advance. 

Question:  Sebastian Hesse with German public radio as well.  Next weekend we're having the party convention of the Social Democratic Party.  One of the issues is Afghanistan and there might even be a vote on stepping out of OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom).  How closely does the U.S. government follow that, how worried are you about it, and is there any communication gap about all the criticism that OEF draws? 

Assistant Secretary Fried:  My colleague from the Defense Department Mary Beth Long was here just the other day and spoke with a great number of German parliamentary deputies, including Social Democrats, about OEF and what it does.  There is a certain misunderstanding in the German media about this.  Most of what OEF does is training the Afghan forces.  Its own operations are a very small portion of its activities.  There are issues of civilian casualties, and we've changed some of the procedures and, as a result, the problem has diminished, which is good.  We want to work, well, as allies have found out, it's one thing to demand that military operations be perfectly conducted and it's another thing actually to, you know, to have to do that.  Some Europeans doing the fighting, particularly in the South, have discovered that the hard way.  But we need to, let's stipulate that we need to do, all of us need to do a better job in Afghanistan, whether it's continuing to knit together our civilian and military elements because success comes from both combined, not through purely military actions; we need to do more to help the Afghan government extend its good governance; we have to intensify our counter-narcotics efforts; we have to do more along the border.  So let's stipulate that there's a lot of work to do, and I don't mind Germany coming in with ideas about how to do it better.  But we certainly hope that pulling out of OEF is an option which Germans and the Social Democrats will see does nothing.  We're in Afghanistan for good reasons.  We need to stay there and get the job done.  Do we need to do it better?  Yes, we do.  Do we need to pull out?  Well, think about the consequences.  Pulling out does what exactly?  What happens in five years, what happens in ten years?  And haven't we seen this movie before?  Don't we know how it ends?  There are consequences, and those who advocate pulling out have to consider not just a position that makes them feel good and pure and absolves them of making hard decisions, but have to consider what would happen if everyone did as they advise.  Sometimes it's easy just to think to yourselves, I'll pull out and not have to face hard choices and then let the Americans do it, and if things go wrong I can always criticize them then.  Well, I thought we were past unilateralism.  We want a multilateral approach.  That means a certain solidarity.  It's hard for Germany; I appreciate what Germany has one.  You know, German troops in the Hindu Kush and all of that.  But the challenges to our security are going to come in unexpected ways and in far-flung areas; we have to get better at how we handle them.  Better.  That means maybe I'm saying we haven't done it well enough.  Okay.  But we have to do it.  We have to learn how to do this better as an alliance multilaterally.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak on this.

Press Attaché Robert Wood:  We have time for one, maybe two questions.  Do you want to follow up on that?

Question:  Also on Afghanistan.  If not pulling out, is the fusion of OEF and ISAF an option for you?  I remember well the U.S. wanted it once and the Germans were among those against?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, you're quite right that Germany wanted to keep them separate and we agreed, at the request of the German government, to keep them separate.  Okay, Germany made a reasonable argument, we're all for that.  We're looking at ways -he question is, what actually works better, what makes us more effective, what gives us a better chance of reducing the problems?  And at that point I'll be guided by the advice of military commanders in the field, of Ambassador Wood, and others in Afghanistan.  So we're certainly open to discussing the issue, but we've taken the advice of our German colleagues seriously in this, and we will continue to do so.

Press Attaché Robert Wood:  One last quick question?

Question:  A short one.  In talking with the Russians, was there a presentation made that tied Kosovo, the CFE, and …

Assistant Secretary Fried:  No (laughter).  No, the reports that Kosovo was somehow tied in are just wrong.  Kosovo didn't come up at the 2+2 at all.  At all.  Therefore I could answer, no.

Question:  Or the CFE?

Assistant Secretary Fried:  Well, CFE certainly did come up.  I was saying no to the question you asked not the question you didn't ask.

Question:  You answered before I said CFE!

Assistant Secretary Fried:  The answer would have still been no.  On CFE, however, yes, these were the two principle issues on the agenda:  CFE, Missile Defense, also post-S.T.A.R.T.  And it is true that they are all, they can all be considered part of a strategic basket of issues in which - and the Russians want to make progress, or at least we do, and I believe the Russians do.  And it is certainly true that if we can bring these issues together and cooperate broadly on a set of strategic issues, that may make it easier to resolve them.  So, that's fair.  But what I said no to was throwing Kosovo into the mix.  That's a tough issue by itself, and I don't see how one does trade-offs, that doesn't make any sense, and so it didn't come up at all in Moscow.

All right.  Well, thank you very much.

Press Attaché Robert Wood:  Thank you, Dan.

(end of press roundtable)