Berlin, March 28, 2007

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Under Secretary Edelman: Nice to be able to meet with all of you this afternoon. I am here in Europe because I was originally scheduled to come for a conference that NATO held yesterday in Munich and the day before on Afghanistan where I was two weeks ago for the U.S. But I thought that I would also continue the work that my colleagues General Obering and Assistant Secretary of State Dan Fried had been engaged in for the last few weeks, discussing with a variety of our partners and allies in Europe the issue of missile defense. I was with General Obering two weeks ago in Paris after he was here. It kind of reminded me after the story he had in the Herald Tribune, based on, I guess, talking to this group of the story of President Kennedy when he went to Paris in 1962, introducing himself as the man who accompanied Jackie Kennedy to Paris. I sort of was the person who accompanied General Obering to Paris. So by the time we got to our press event there, he was already a rock star. I had been earlier that week actually meeting informally with the NATO PermReps. General Obering and I had briefed back in November both to NATO, the North Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia Council. And he has done that recently as well, and will be doing it again in April with capitals reinforcing delegations in Brussels with technical experts. This is obviously a discussion that we need to have with a variety of folks in Europe, both in the context of the Alliance in Brussels, in the NATO-Russia Council, but then also in capitals with people. So yesterday I was in Prague, returning to where I had been previously the Deputy Chief of Mission ten years ago. It was my first trip back; I had the opportunity to discuss there with a variety of folks in the government and the Parliament the issues involved in missile defense, as well as with some folks in the press. And I am here today. And I will be headed to London tomorrow where I will continue discussions with my UK colleagues on a variety of issues, including Afghanistan and other issues, but also including the missile defense issue since we continue to have discussions with the UK, which is a part of the program by virtue of its hosting of the Fylingdales radar. Why don’t I stop there and then I’ll just be happy to try and answer your questions to the best of my ability.

Louis Charbonneau, Reuters: Sir, just a little while ago, the Czech government officially announced that it had formally agreed to open up talks with the United States. I wonder if you could comment on the significance of that. And also in a German newspaper today, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, made some of the standard criticisms that they have been making all along about the project. But he also seemed to ratchet up a notch their belief that there is going to be something more, that there is a hidden agenda in the missile defense plan, and that some day the silos may not have defensive weapons, but offensive weapons. I just wondered if you could respond to this escalating rhetoric from the Russian side.

Under Secretary Edelman: Let me say first, in my discussions yesterday in the Czech Republic I was aware the cabinet would probably be discussing the response to the diplomatic note that we had sent to them some weeks ago proposing the beginning of negotiations on the possible deployment of X-Band radar to the Czech Republic. I didn’t have, I wasn’t told that the answer would come today but I understood that it might well come out of the cabinet meeting. And I think we are gratified that we have gotten the answer and that we can begin the discussion. One thing that was clear to me from my time in the Czech Republic is that there are lots of questions that people have – both parliamentarians, but the public at large. I was on a television program last evening, a live discussion with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Schwarzenburg, and as well a representative of the Social Democratic Party and some activists from the Czech Republic as well. You know those are legitimate questions that people have and we want to approach this in a very open and transparent manner – as we have to do in our own missile defense program in the United States. We have a lot of questions we have to answer from our elected representatives. We have a lot of information we have to provide them, with regard to environmental impact statements; for instance, when we put a radar in Quadulane; or to put another system together, we have to make environmental impact statements, so the questions that people have are good questions, are legitimate questions, and they deserve to be discussed.

On the question of Minister Lavrov’s op-ed piece, I guess it was in Handelsblatt, if I am not mistaken, my German is not good enough to make my way through it but I did get an English translation. First, we have been and continue to want to consult with the government of Russia about this project. We have said from the outset and continue to believe that there are prospects for cooperation with Russia within the parameters of this project because we think the threat of ballistic missile proliferation in the twenty countries that have ballistic missile programs represents a threat not only to the United States and to its allies and other friends in Europe -- but to Russia, as well. And I think that’s reflected in some comments Russia has made about other aspects of the various international arms control agreements. And so we think that it is perfectly fine to consult with them. I found the arguments in Minister Lavrov’s article a bit flawed. Russia, for some 35 years, has had the right under the ABM Treaty to deploy interceptors, missile defense interceptors. It has done so. It has had the right to deploy up to 100. I believe it has around 85 or so deployed around Moscow. They are nuclear tipped interceptors. Why for 35 years that fact has not de-stabilized the international security situation, and ten interceptors that we now propose to base in Poland, which don’t have nuclear warheads. In fact they have no conventional explosive warhead. They are purely a kinetic missile that destroys the other missile in an intercept by virtue of the kinetic energy released when the two missiles collide. Why that is de-stabilizing while for some 35 years Russia has had defensive missiles deployed and that wasn’t de-stabilizing, I just don’t understand.

In addition, as I mentioned, these missiles have no warhead. They cannot be used offensively. They go up and intercept. They are not a ground-to-ground weapon. They are a ground-to-air weapon. I suppose it is a bit of an advance in the argument that we are no longer hearing that this could somehow, that these ten interceptors could somehow interfere with Russia’s first strike capability and its nuclear deterrent because the interceptors are rayed against hundreds of launchers and thousands of warheads. That obviously doesn’t make any sense from a technical point of view. The idea that somehow the launchers could then be reconfigured for a different purpose that would be offensive in nature and a threat to Russia is a little hard to understand. I mean these are two-stage missiles. To reach Russia, they would have to be reconfigured. You would have to put a different kind of warhead on it because obviously with no warhead, it doesn’t present much of a threat to anybody. We would have to probably reconfigure the launcher. And these things would be very visible. We have invited the Russians to come and look at our facilities at Fort Greeley where we have our interceptors deployed. And we have said, and we continue to say, that if we reach agreement with the government of Poland and the government of the Czech Republic on the radar and on the missile deployment, we are prepared, if it is acceptable to the Polish and the Czech governments because they are sovereign governments, to let the Russians come and have transparency at those sites and examine those sites and assure themselves that they are not offensive and not a threat to Russia.

Stefan Löwenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Is there any concern in the American administration that this subject could be the subject of the next German election campaign? And what do you think about the words of Mr. Beck, head of the Social Democrat party: We don’t need [aside: no education. Laughter] …

Under Secretary Edelman: I’m sorry, I didn’t hear the last part. I lost it after education.

Stefan Löwenstein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Mr. Beck has said that we don’t need more rockets in Europe. Missiles.

Under Secretary Edelman: I would certainly hope that we can discuss this issue in a variety of contexts, including the Alliance context and including bilaterally, in a way that doesn’t make it a political football in anybody’s domestic politics. This is about an effort to defend Europe and extend some benefit from the investment we have made in defending the United States. When President Bush came into office, one of the things he decided was to make sure that the missile defense program of record – at that time – which was a national missile defense program should not be seen as something that defended only the United States. We spent a lot of time, particularly the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, in the Cold War trying to make sure that the defense of the United States was not de-coupled from the defense of Europe. Today we face different and new threats. But I think the wisdom of not de-coupling the defense of the United States and the defense of Europe remains intact. We already have, we will have when we complete the program of record that we are currently are embarked on with our interceptors at Fort Greeley and in California and our radars both in Asia and in Europe, to defend the continental United States against an Iranian missile attack, for instance. But we don’t have the capability now to protect Europe against the long-range threat. What we are talking about is something that would enable not only the United States to be defended, but its forces and facilities in Europe to be defended and our friends and allies in Europe to be defended. And so that is the effort. I would only amend the other statement to say, well, it would be good not to have any missiles in Europe – but I certainly hope there aren’t any incoming ones from any of the twenty countries that are developing ballistic missile capabilities, but one can’t guarantee that, and so I think ten interceptors in Europe to try and devalue and dissuade people from pursuing programs of offensive ballistic missiles which they are already doing -- and in some cases at quite an advanced pace -- to dissuade them from pursuing those programs or from trying to use those missiles for some political purpose is a reasonable price to pay.

Mathias Brüggmann, Handelsblatt: I wanted to ask once again about Mr. Lavrov. There was a little bit of another argument. He said who gives Russia, or others, a guarantee that there are now ten interceptors but in ten years there may be ten other missiles in the same launchers. That was his question. And there was another argument, not from Mr. Lavrov, but from a Member of Parliament of Russia, that told us why the United States doesn’t have a discussion with Russia to base these interceptors in Russia, which would be (inaudible) Turkey, what should be better if it’s really to protect from Iranian rockets.

Under Secretary Edelman: I’m not sure who the parliamentarian was, and I’m not sure -- I haven’t seen the full statement so it would be a little bit hard for me to comment. The decision to pursue the radar in the Czech Republic and the interceptor site in Poland was based on a fairly rigorous study of the geometry and physics involved in maximizing your ability to have a successful intercept. As I said, we are perfectly open to talk to the Russians about cooperation. They already have, as I said, their own interceptor site arrayed around Moscow. But we are prepared to cooperate and to talk with them about it. As I said, if there was an attempt some time down the road to change the configuration of the ten interceptors in Poland, were we to reach agreement with the Poles, this would be something that would be very clearly obvious to others. First of all, it would be something that we would have to do in cooperation with the government of Poland. It would become, I am sure, a subject of discussion in NATO. It would become public knowledge and we have offered to be transparent and open with the Russians to give them the access, as I described, pending the agreement of the other governments involved, and I just don’t think the argument holds water.

Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune: It seems like there are really two countries, or rather two sections of one country, and another whole country is critical of the system. This is Russia and especially for the Social Democrats in Germany. Given your conversations over the past couple of weeks and months, why do you think this is so? What are the real concerns of the Russians and the Social Democrats? What do you think are the real concerns?

Under Secretary Edelman: Well, I haven’t had a chance really to talk with any representatives of the SPD so I will know better perhaps by the end of the day what their concerns are. But as I said, there are reasonable issues to be discussed and we are happy to discuss them in an open way. I think most of the arguments I’ve heard about the system are based either on misinformation about the system or misunderstandings about the system; or issues about whether missile defense is an appropriate way to deal with the threat. Those are, you know, valid arguments. We have, in the United States as well, and I think the administration is prepared to engage those arguments.

As to what is motivating Russia, I hesitate to speculate. I think that the reaction along technical lines clearly is out of proportion to the technical issues. I think actually it was your article that I read in the Herald Tribune which had the comments from Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the NATO Secretary-General, and I thought he addressed these questions very well, in discussing why, from a technical point of view, these arguments don’t hold water. If there are other issues that are of concern to Russia that underlie this reaction, I think it’s really for them to try to elucidate specifically what it is. But I would reiterate, we are prepared to try and address all these questions in discussion and consultation with them. But at the end of the day, we may not be able to persuade them. I hope we can.

David McHugh, Associated Press: I would like to go back to the offer, if that’s what it was, to let the Russians inspect the interceptor site in Poland. Would that be? Can you say a little bit more about that? Would that be a permanent presence or periodic inspections like we had under arms control? And has that been proposed to the Russians?

Under Secretary Edelman: No, we have said several times that we are prepared to – pending the agreement of the Poles and the Czechs. Look, we can’t get ahead of ourselves here. We haven’t, we just got today the word that the Czech government is willing to sit down and talk to us about a radar. We are still waiting to hear from the Poles to respond to our diplomatic note about the interceptor site. Whatever we reach agreement with them on, we would then have to, if we were going to make an offer to the Russians. We have said, we are willing, we have already offered to have them come to Fort Greeley. And the issue is openness and transparency. We are ready to discuss the terms and conditions under which they might come. I don’t think we’re looking to negotiate some regime or arms control arrangement but we are certainly willing to make this facility available to them to satisfy themselves that these concerns about offensive weapons being put there are nonsense. But that would be pending the agreement of the host countries, which are sovereigns on the territory where these things would be deployed.

Joachim Zepelin, Financial Times Deutschland: Given you would have a positive agreement with the Czech Republic and Poland, how much do you think that can also change the relationship between the U.S. and those countries, especially as you know the Polish want to become part of the visa waiver program, and other questions? So is there something in it for those countries?

Under Secretary Edelman: With regard to the visa waiver program, although I am a career foreign service officer and when I was Deputy Chief of Mission in Prague, I worked on the visa waiver program and the issue of Czech eligibility for it in those days – so this is a long-standing issue. I don’t do those issues now that really are the work of my colleagues in the Department of State. I know that the President undertook to try and address these kinds of questions. We have proposed some changes to the Congress. It’s now in the hands of the Congress, and we hope that they will act in a way that is favorable.

There will undoubtedly be some ancillary economic benefit from the work that would be done, both for the deployment of the radar and of the interceptor field in Poland. It’s a little bit early to really get into detail about how much that might amount to. But there’s also no doubt that being part of this system does create a new web of relationships with the United States in terms of the bilateral relationship, just as with any other country where we have a base or a facility and a presence. As to what other defense needs might come up as a result of these deployments, that’s going to be a subject of discussion once the sides sit down to negotiate.

Question: Is there any option for another third base in southern Caucasus?

Under Secretary Edelman: We are not looking at an option for an interceptor site in the Caucasus. It’s not part of any of the program discussions that I have seen. I think we’ve got our hands full right now dealing with what we are dealing with.

Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune: It depends on who you talk to in Poland. Some Poles say that. The Polish government seems to have two schools of thought on how to negotiate with Washington over the system. And one school says, let’s go for it and that’s it. We are delighted to have this security. The other school says, yes, we want this system but we know it’s going to upset Russia and therefore, because we are going to agree to accept the interceptors, we want in addition a Patriot missile system. Is this true?

Under Secretary Edelman: I have seen some of the discussions in op-ed columns and other places about how this would go. Again, I don’t want to get ahead of the actual negotiations. I think that we ought to let them take their course. We are prepared to talk to the respective governments about whatever needs they think arise as a result of the deployment. And if there are things that are reasonable and make sense, we are open to looking at those things. But I wouldn’t want to, ahead of time, say, yes, Patriot or some other deployment necessarily is the answer to the problem because I am not quite sure what the problem is yet. And so we have to have a discussion of what it is that they think the consequences are that need to be mitigated and then we can figure out what the proper mitigation strategy would be.

Nina Werkhäuser, Deutsche Welle Radio: When do you expect the whole system to be ready and working? And could you comment on the effects for Germany precisely? Would it improve something for us? Could anything fall on our heads? Whatever.

Under Secretary Edelman: The point of the system is to prevent things from falling on people’s heads.

Our hope is that we could begin work on the construction phase sometime next year, probably towards the end of the year. And what we would like is to have the initial capability in place by about 2012. And the objective, I believe, is to try and make sure that we can be ahead of the threat. It takes time to deploy these systems. And there is a great deal of uncertainty about the threat. I think that it’s worth remembering that in the summer of 1998, there were people who said that it would be years before North Korea could fly a multi-stage missile with intercontinental range. Two months later, they fired one over Japan. So there’s a certain range of uncertainty about how quickly the threat will mature and develop. And we would like to have the capability in place before that.

I think the question you are asking about things falling on people’s heads had to do with the question of debris that might come from the system. And there, I think there is some technical misunderstanding about this. I think there’s a sense that people have, at least in the popular mind, that when an intercept takes place, the two missiles collide and the debris falls down. But you need to remember two things. One, because these things are moving at extraordinarily high speeds, in fact, once the intercept and the explosion takes place, the debris keeps going on the same trajectory. Secondly, this goes on outside the atmosphere. And so, we believe most of what will be released will burn up on re-entry because our modeling suggests that the biggest pieces would be roughly about eight inches long from the result of the kinetic impact of the interceptor with the incoming missile.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: Any relation to Kenneth?

Under Secretary Edelman: No, but we used to get each other’s mail when he was the director of ACDA and I was the Special Assistant to Secretary Schulz.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: I thought there might be some dynasty in the arms control business.

Under Secretary Edelman: No, no relation, but a friend.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: First question, any economic benefits for the Czechs and the Poles in this situation? How much can they benefit from this in terms of building and?

Under Secretary Edelman: Well, I think in the answer I just gave to the earlier question, there is some ancillary economic benefit to the deployment of the radar in the Czech Republic and the missile field in Poland. It’s a little too early to say exactly what those numbers are but they would be, I think, economically significant. The ongoing benefit is a little hard to say. It depends a little bit on precisely the arrangements that are worked out afterwards, but we don’t expect large groups of people to be there. There’s not going to be a large footprint or presence. But there are a lot of issues about contract guards and things like that, that will have to be worked out. So there will be some ongoing benefit. It’s a little hard to quantify right now.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: There’s been a lot of speculation the last couple of days, with the oil markets flaming up because of speculation about possible military action against Iraq. Can you say anything about that?

Under Secretary Edelman: I am not aware of any imminent military action against Iraq. No, right now we are engaged in a diplomatic effort to deal with the threat posed by the Iranian nuclear program with which we have worked very closely with the EU-3, including the government of the Federal Republic, and more broadly with the so-called P5+1. My colleague and friend Nick Burns has been deeply engaged in that. Of course, we just had a second Resolution, 1747 in the Security Council. And that’s where our effort is right now – on the diplomatic side.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: Another question, not exactly on missile defense, but in the neighborhood. There has been irritation in Berlin about a letter concerning MEADS, that the U.S. wanted to have some time because they had to stretch the monetary -- could you comment on this?

Under Secretary Edelman: Well, I am only vaguely aware of that issue. I understood that there was a funding issue but I am also told that the issue has been worked out. But I am not, frankly, familiar with the details.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: You already spoke about the SPD in Germany.

Under Secretary Edelman: I didn’t. Somebody else did.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: What do you expect from the Chancellor? Do you expect that she will have a clear position on it?

Under Secretary Edelman: I will be going to the Chancellery later today to talk to some of the folks there. And I think people right now are in many ways still in the information-gathering mode. I think we bear a little bit of the burden here – of not having perhaps come out of the gate as fast as we should have with information about the system. And we are doing that now. And I think once people understand what we are talking about, some of the concerns they may understandably have will be assuaged. It’s worth remembering that when the NATO heads of state and government met in Riga at the end of November, that they agreed, first of all, that there was a threat because of ballistic missile proliferation. And they agreed that on the basis of the feasibility study that had been done by NATO, that missile defense was technologically compatible, complementary and irreparable.

Mathias Brüggmann, Handelsblatt: I wanted to follow up what you just said. When General Obering was here, he discussed this idea of making whatever NATO missile defense capabilities are developed compatible with this plan for what would be in the Czech Republic and Poland. How would that work and would this make the Czech-Polish-U.S. facilities NATO facilities? Or would they be offered to NATO but run by the various countries?

Under Secretary Edelman: I think you asked the question about the Czech note. We just got the Czech note. And we are just beginning this discussion. So to say what the exact relationship will be like between what we are talking about and what NATO is talking about is a little hard to say when we don’t even know what it is that NATO will ultimately have. What we want to do is make sure we develop it in route so that it is complementary and compatible. I think the best way to think about what we are talking about is something that would be an initial capability to defend most of Europe, but not all, against the long-range threat because some of the threat – the parts that are really close to Iran of Europe, you can’t quite get to with what we are talking about. You need capability for short and medium range missiles to defend them. But we can think of this as an initial national contribution from the four nations, five nations actually, that would be involved at that point because the UK, Denmark, Poland, Czech Republic and the U.S. would be involved in the system at that point, to a broader NATO system as it develops.

Judy Dempsey, International Herald Tribune: Just say you managed to put this shield across which as General Obering has described would cover most parts of Europe. Those countries not involved in it, would they have to pay for it? And secondly, you mentioned the NATO feasibility study and heaven knows if it will ever get off the ground. Would it duplicate the U.S. system or is that more continental missile based?

Under Secretary Edelman: Well, I think our thinking is that NATO will be working in the theater defense, the short and medium range part of this. The system we would deploy would provide the coverage for the long-range system. We have invested about 90 billion dollars in missile defense. I don’t think it makes any sense for NATO nations to replicate those kinds of expenditures to try and benefit from the technological advancements that we have been able to reap from what we have done. So again, in terms of exactly how the costs will be borne and all of that, we are far away from any discussion of that but we want to make sure that we have an initial capability, as I said, to meet the timeline that we see developing of the threat.

Alan Posner, Welt am Sonntag: Mr. Secretary, under pressure from her coalition partners of the Democrats, Mrs. Merkel, the Chancellor, has said, and I think Mr.Steinmeier has said it too, that they want to discuss this whole issue in NATO. Considering what you said about what was discussed in Riga and what the German government must surely know about the plans of the United States, which weren’t developed yesterday, is she being disingenuous?

Under Secretary Edelman: No, I wouldn’t want to suggest anything like that. We are open to discussions in NATO about this because we have already had some. I think not everything that gets discussed at Brussels necessarily gets immediately absorbed in capitals. And that’s understandable. It happens in the United States of America too. So again, I think we bear some of the burden for not having been out enough discussing this, but I am hoping we are going to try and make up for lost time with both the efforts that General Obering and I and others are making. Assistant Secretary Fried and I hope other senior U.S. officials will be out talking about this in the weeks and months ahead. I expect we will continue to have discussions in various NATO fora leading up to the Defense Ministerial in June. I am sure it will be discussed there. I don’t think there will be any shortage of opportunities to discuss this in the NATO context, as well as in capitals.

Nina Werkhäuser, Deutsche Welle Radio: Traveling through Europe and discussing this matter in different countries and different capitals, do you feel that there is something like a common European defense policy from your American point of view? Or does every country have their own viewpoint?

Under Secretary Edelman: On missile defense specifically?

Nina Werkhäuser, Deutsche Welle Radio: Specifically and generally a common defense policy in Europe, the European Union.

Under Secretary Edelman: Well, I haven’t really been discussing ESDP per say with people so I really couldn’t comment on that. But with regard to missile defense, in general, in my conversations, I have had very few folks among my defense ministry counterparts who take issue with the fact that there is a threat and that we need to find some means collectively to deal with it. There are lots of issues, of course, that arise out of a discussion of this kind that are both specific to some countries or broader with regard to the relationship between this kind of system and the broader struggle against proliferation of these capabilities and deterrence as a concept. I think that’s natural. There are a variety of viewpoints, but at the end of the day, I don’t know that those differences in viewpoint will end up having an impact on the outcome. That it is to say, there is a genuine, genuine understanding that we need to find some mechanism for dealing with this and an openness to doing that.

Robert A. Wood, Press Attaché: This will be the last question.

Chris Burns, Bloomberg Television: Is there any hope that by pushing this issue now that this might send a message to the Iranians that they are wasting their time and money on trying to build a bomb?

Under Secretary Edelman: I absolutely think that we think of this in terms of a continuum. First, trying to assure our allies that they can be defended against these kinds of threats. But I also think we want to dissuade countries like Iran from pursuing capabilities like this. You have to go back to the antecedent question, as it were, which is: Why are countries like Iran, and North Korea, pursuing these kinds of capabilities? And the reason is, just in economic terms, they regard this as a fairly cheap way of countering the preponderance of power that the United States and its allies represent around the world. So, one of the purposes we have is to raise the cost to them of pursuing these systems. I don’t think it’s necessarily accidental that, for instance, we see North Korea engaging in negotiations now. As we have begun to develop this capability that is right now capable of beginning to manage the threat that North Korea might represent -- among other reasons, I am not saying that’s the only reason that North Korea has come to the table. I mean, obviously, pressure from its neighbors like China and the impact of the financial measures that the United States has taken to protect its currency from counterfeiting and other illicit activities -- there are a variety of reasons but I don’t think one should slight the notion that all the money that they are pouring in to developing these weapon systems instead of feeding their people may not be so well spent if they can be negated by defenses. I think that’s definitely a part of the equation.

Robert A. Wood, Press Attache: Thank you all very much. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.